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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the matter of the Estate of ORA BUNDY, 
Deceased. 
DORA B. GODDARD and JOHN A. BUNDY, 
A pp·ellants, 
vs. 
LOVINA R. BUNDY, as Administratrix and 
Personally, 
Resp-ondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by Dora B. Goddard and John 
A. Bundy, children and heirs at law of Ora Bundy, de-
ceased, from the decree of distribution of the lower 
court overruling their objections to the final account 
and petition of the administratrix, and excluding . the 
appellant John A. Bundy from participation in the final 
distribution. Appellants have also appealed from the 
order of the lower court refusing to relieve them of 
their default and to permit them to file o~t of time their 
motions for amendment of the findings and decree and 
for a new trial. 
The respondent, Lovina R. Bundy, is the widow of 
the decedent, and acted as administratrix of his estate. 
She is the step-mother of the appellants. 
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Appellants' objections were to a. credit of $10,600 
claimed by respondent for family allowance paid herself 
during a protracted administration, to the respondent's 
failure to inventory and account for certain property, 
particularly furniture of the estate, and to payment of 
compensation to respondent administratrix, appellants 
claiming respondent had waived the same, and further, 
has forfeited the right to compensation by misconduct 
in office in eonnection with the other matters involved. 
The appellant John A. Bundy was excluded from 
final distribution on the lower court's own motion and 
' this action also is here involve_d. 
The foregoing brief statement of the issues is in-
tended to be merely preliminary and for purposes of 
orientation. 
In this statement, for convenience, the files of the 
lower court embracing the petitions, pleadings, orders, 
inventories, accounts, etc., filed with the clerk will be 
referred to as the ''Record'' (R), and the transcript of 
the testimony on the hearing of appellants' objections 
to the aecount will be referred to as the "Transcript" 
(Tr.), and the transcript of the testimony (filed herein 
July 11, 1950) of John A. Bundy on the return on 
August 8, 1949, of the citation issued to him will be 
referred to as the "Supplemental Transcript," ( S · Tr.). 
Ora Bundy died intestate on June 12, 1946, leaving 
him surviving his widow, the respondent, and his two 
children by a former marriage, the appellants herein. 
{R 001, :002) 
Mrs. Bundy first appeared on the scene as a. house~ 
kee-per, three or four years before her marriage. (Tr. 2) 
At the time of the marriage of decedent and respond-
2 
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ent on November 26, 1926, the appellants \vert~ children 
of tender years. Thereafter and until the marringe of 
appellants they and their father and step-mother main-
tained an ordinary family relationship, (Tr. 12, 21, 27), 
although the dang·hter, Dora Goddard, felt some hesi-
tation about questioning the activities of her stepmother 
after her father's death. (Tr. 21) Dora reposed confi-
dence in her step-mother to look after her interests. (Tr. 
21) 
At the time of his death Ora Bundy was in the con-
tracting bu~iness in partnership with his wife and two 
children. He owned a 35% interest, Mrs. Bundy a 
25% interest, aJ?-d the two children 20% each. (Ob-
jectors Ex. 7, Tr. 89) 
Lovina Bundy testified that she brought to this 
marriage some furniture, some personal things, and nine 
shares of Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co. stock worth 
about $1260 on her own estimate. ( Tr. 52 and 2) Her 
father left her about $3000, but this was mostly used up 
before Bundy's death. (Tr. 52) 
During the period of her marriage to Mr. Bundy 
the respondent was never gainfully employed. (Tr. 51) 
And yet at the time of Mr. Bundy's death she had, -or 
acquired by right of survivorship of him separate prop-
erty as follows : 
3 
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Item Probable Value 
9 shares stock of Davis & W eher 
Counties Canal Co. ----------------------------------$1260.00 
Life Insurance on decedent's life, 
payable $87.50 semi -annually ---------~------ 5000.00 
U. S. War Savings Bonds (Series 
E) . _____ ...... ____________ ---------------------------------------- 4916.00 
U. S. Bonds, Series G ---------------------------------- 1000.00 
W. 0 .W. Life Insurance on de-
cedent's life ------------------------------------------------ 1017.30 
Family Home at 1432 25th Street, 
Ogden, Utah, sold 15 months 
later for ------------------------------------------------------17900.00 
Savings account -------------------------------------------- 300.00 
Checking account ---------------------------------- ''not large'' 
25% interest on Ora Bundy & Co., 
a co-partnership (realized, at 
date of trial, approximately)-------------·---- 9548.00 
Total. .......... _______________________________ $40,941.30 
(Tr. 2-4, 109-110) 
Then, on August 27, 1947, in partial distribution of 
the estate, the respondent received $10,000 in cash to-
gether with a 10 foot strip of land which constituted a 
par,t of the lot on which the family home was situate. 
(R 096-097, 161) 
During the period of the Bundy marriage, Mr. 
Bundy paid all the bills except a few small purchases 
of odds. and ends of furniture, dishes, etc.., which Mrs. 
Bundy testified she purchased out of her own money. 
(Tr. 12-13, 51-53) But at the time of his death there 
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'"'as in the family home a substantial amount of furni-
ture paid for directly by ~Ir. Bundy. (Tr. 54, 14-18) 
The efforts of counsel for appellants to question Mrs. 
Bundy and :\Irs. Goddard as to the identity of this prop-
erty ( ""hieh "·as never inventoried by respondent) were 
defeated by ruling·s of the court, entered in part on the 
court's o'vn motion, excluding- the evidence and instruct-
ing the ""itness not to -ans""er. (Tr. 13-18, 53-54) 
~foreover, there "~as in decedent's house in Brigham 
City (occupied by John Bundy, decedent's son) a.t the 
date of death a quantity of furniture which ''Jack'' 
claimed as a gift from his father. Jack's claim was 
disputed by ~Irs. Bundy, who dispossessed the son, sold 
part of the furniture (accounting to the estate for the 
proceeds) and appropriated the rest to her own use. 
At the time of the trial this furniture was in use in the 
home Mrs. Bundy purchased for herself after the partial 
distribution in August, 1947. This furniture was never 
inventoried, appraised, or accounted for althoug-h she 
testified she intended to have it distributed to her and 
charged against her share of the estate. ( Tr. 77-80) 
It was not so charged. (R 222) 
Objectors offered in evidence a copy (the "best 
evidence" rule being waiv·ed) of Decedent's intended last 
will and testament signed by him less than a month be-
fore his death, by paragraph 2 of which he assumed to 
dispose of "The home at 1432 25th Street in Ogden, 
Utah, together with all furnishings (except the grand 
piano which belongs to Dora B. Goddard)'' as his own 
property. This was offered to prove Decedent's intent 
and state of mind regarding his ownership of the furni-
ture, etc. The Court, however, rejected the offer. ( Tr. 
7-9) (Italics supplied.) 
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It is interesting to note that Mr. Bundy, by para-
graph 7 of this document, also attempted to dispose of 
the ''Property'' at 531 So. 5th East Street, Brigham 
City, as his own. 
Immediately after the death of the decedent, the 
heirs had a conference at the family home. Dora God-
dard made some suggestions regarding counsel to be 
retained, but Mrs. Bundy "insisted" that Mr. Holther 
be called in, and that was done. ( Tr. 6, 25) He explained 
that Mr. Goddard (Dora's husband) could ·not act as 
co-administrator because of his non-residence and sug·-
gested that Mrs. Bundy act, advising that the adminis-
tratrix would be under his guidance and would follow his 
advice. Dora and Jack then signed a written consent 
that Mrs. Bu;ndy be appointed administratrix, specific-
ally waiving her ineligibility by reason of her being a 
surviving partner of the decedent. (Apparently this 
was prepared by Mr. Holther.) Dora does not recall 
any mention made, or discussion had, regarding this 
statutory ineligibility. (Tr. 9-10, 25-26, 38-39) This 
document was never filed with the court, the petition 
being based on respondent's right as surviving wife, 
without mention of the partnership relation. 
At the hearing, appellants offered to prove that 
Mrs. Bundy, at the time they consented to her appoint-
ment, orally waived any claim for an administratrix 
fee, but that w-as excluded by the court as not being 
within the issues drawn. Appellants' motion for leave 
to amend to present the issue was denied by the court, 
and the testimony, admitted pro-forma, was stricken~ 
(Tr. 10-11) 
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Letters of Administration 'vere issued to respond-
ent on her petition on July 8, 1946. 
On October 10, 1946, respondent paid to herself out 
of the funds of the estate, $1000 as an ''advance''. On 
December 30, 1946, she similarly paid to herself $1500, 
and on April 12, 194 7, $3300, as ''family allowance.'' 
(R 081) 
Two weeks after this third payment, on April 29, 
1947, she filed her verified petition for a family allow-
ance. (R 033-035) Omitting the formal parts, the pe-
tition reads as follows : 
"TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT" 
Your petitioner, Lovina R. Bundy, respect-
fully represents and shows : 
I 
That Ora Bundy died intestate on the 12th 
day of June, 1946; that this honorable Court, 
after proceedings duly and regularly had herein, 
on the 8th day of July, 1946, appointed your 
petitioner Administratrix of the estate of said 
decedent; that your petitioner thereafter, and on 
said same day, duly qualified as such Adminis-
tratrix and Letters of Administration were duly 
issued to her, and ever since that date your pe-
titioner has been and now is the duly appointed, 
qualified and acting Administratrix of the 
Estate of the above named Ora Bundy, deceased. 
II 
That your petitioner is the surviving wife of 
said decedent, and she, together with John A. 
Bundy and Dora Goddard, are the sole and only 
heirs at law of said decedent; that all of said 
heirs at law are of legal age. 
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III 
That the estate of said decedent is solvent. 
IV 
That your petitioner has caused due notice 
to creditors to be given for the time and in the 
manner required hy law, and this Court on the 
26th day of November, 1946, made and entered 
its Decree showing that due and legal notice to 
creditors has been given. 
v 
That all creditors claims presented have been 
allowed and paid, and all of the expenses of the 
last illness and burial of said deeedent, together 
with taxes upon the real and personal property 
of the estate, and the aecrued costs of probate 
have been paid; that the inheritance taxes have 
not yet been determined and fixed. 
VI 
That your petitioner is entitled, as the sur-
viving wife, for such allowance for her mainten-
ance and support as is reasonable under all cir· 
cumstances to be paid to her for the period com-
mencing with the date of the death of said de-
cedent on June 12, 1946, and continuing during 
the pendency of the administration of this estate; 
and your petitioner verily believes, and so states 
the fact to be, that such reasonable allowance is 
$300.00 per month. 
WHER.EFORE, your petitioner prays that 
upon hearing after notice duly given this honor-
able Court make its order allowing and award-
ing the sum of $300.00 per month for her support 
and maintenance during the administration of 
said estate, and for such other and further order 
as may he meet and proper in the premises. 
/s/ Lovina R. Bundy 
PETITIONER 
/s/ David K. Holther 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Notice of hearing· on ''the petition Lovina R. Bundy, 
praying· for an order fixing- and allowing of family 
allowance'' "~as giYen by mailing and posting notices. 
(R 036-037) .A.s appears from the files, both of appel-
lants have lived out of Weber County throughout the 
administration. 
Because of the confidence they reposed in their step-
mother, the administ,ratrix, and her counsel (Tr. 20-22), 
appellants did not attempt to press actively to determine 
their rights or to· supervise the administration of the 
estate. They expected a family allowance to be made. 
(Tr 32-33) Under these circumstances they made no 
appearance in respect to the petition for family al-
lowance, and so on May 12, 1947, eleven months after 
decedent's death, the pettition was granted, and the 
court 
'' ________ ORDERED that there be allowed and paid 
to said widow, Lovina R. Bundy, for her support 
and maintenance the sum of $300.00 per month, 
beginning on the 12th day of June, 1946, and 
continuing until the further order of the Court.'' 
(R ~2) 
At that time no inventory had been filed. It was 
not filed until June 21, 1947. (R 056-065) Nor did Mrs. 
Bundy, either personally or as administratrix, disclose 
to the court or to the heirs the fact that she had separ-
ately owned resources worth $40,900-more than half 
the value of the entire estate as subsequently appraised. 
It appears that the bulk of the assets in the part-
nership, Ora Bundy and Co., were liquidated in the part-
nership with ease and. expedition, for on February 30 
( ~), 1947, the partnership paid the estate, on account 
9 
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of loans and advancements, $36,500, and on June 1, 1947, 
there was $36,439.57 in c.ash in the partnership hank 
account to pay the balanc.e of partnership obligations 
and to pay a liquidating dividend. ( Tr 89, Objectors 
Exh. 7) The partnership obligations were discharged 
and the dividend paid on or about June 16, 1947. (Ibid. 
and R 080) Mrs. Bundy received $5,282.12 in addition 
to an advance of $2000 she had previously made to her-
self. (Ibid.) It should be observed, however, that on 
June 21, 194 7, she made a ''Refund'' of $1500 to the 
estate. 
Then, as hereinbefore stated, on August 27, 1947, 
Mrs. Bundy received $10,000 in cash upon a partial 
distribution of the estate. (R 161) 
Mrs. Bundy paid herslf, during administration, 
family allowance at the rate of $300 per month from 
the date of decedent's death on June 12, 1946, until May 
22, 1949, six days after filing her final account, a total 
of $10,600 in addition to her other assets. (R 154) 
It was stipulated that within 15 months after de-
cedent's death the estate had on hand sufficient money 
to pay all debts, costs and expenses of administration. 
(Tr 4) Respondent's first account, verified August 
13, 1947, shows cash rec.eipts of $69,000, and dis-
bursements of less than $18,000 (R 080-082), with a 
cash balance in excess o.f $51,000. 
As early as June 9, 1947, counsel for tbe respond-
ent wrote the heirs that if taxes payable by the estate 
are ''definitely determined soon, then I will likely re-
commend final distribution rather than a partial dis-
tribution, and have those assets which we are finding 
10 
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difficult to liquidate distributed in kind, so the estate 
can be closed and the bond terminated and the work of 
liquidation of questionable assets can be continued after 
the close of the estate.'' (Objectors Exh. 7) 
The estate, however, 'vas not closed. The admin-
istration "~as continued, and petition for final distri-
bution v.Tas not filed until nearly two years later, on 
May 16, 1949. (R 153-164) 
In the meantime respondent continued her family 
allowance. 
The Utah State Inheritance tax was paid June 10, 
1948, just one year later. The Federal Estate tax was 
not paid until ~larch 1, 1949·, although under the law 
it was due September 12, 1947, and presumably bore 
interest at 6% from that date as provided by law. 
So far as we have been able to find, the respond-
ent has nowhere made or attempted an explanation or 
excuse for this long delay in paying the taxes due, which 
counsel indicated was the only reason for delaying 
final distribution. Her only explanation for delay in 
closing the estate was that an agreement as to the man-
ner of distribution could not be reached (Tr 80) and 
that because she feared a lawsuit concerning certain 
partnership dealing with one Holmes. (Tr 101-102, 93-
95) The Holmes deal was financed by the partnership 
(Tr 95) and hence was a partnership venture. 
There is nothing in the record to show that the sit-
uation in May of 1949 when respondent asked for dis-
tribution was substanially different from the situation 
obtaining· when partial distribution was had in 1947. 
Two or three additional items had been sold in the' 
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two year period, and the partnership had paid the estate 
an additional liquidating dividend of some $2400, but 
there w-ere still on harnd a n;umber of unliquidated items 
of substantial value, both in the estate an.d in the part· 
nership'. (R 160-164, Tr. 73-74) These were, on April29, 
19,50, in fact distributed in kind as contemplated by 
counsel's suggestion of June 9, 1947. (R 220-225) No 
reason has been given by the respondent as to why this 
could not have been done in the first place. 
Dora Goddard did not know the amount of the 
family allowance until January of 1948, an earlier in-
quiry having failed to get that information. (Tr 18-19) 
She assumed it would be automatically discontinued 
when distribution was made. (Tr 19) In August of 
1948 she learned for the first time that the adminis-
tratrix was continuing to pay herself family allowance. 
Perceiving that this was depleting her share and 
her brother's share of the esta.te, she began to urge the 
early closing of the estate. ( Tr 20) On September 3, 
1948 she wrote counsel for the administratrix as fol· 
lows: 
''Am wondering what's transpiring. The time 
element thus far involved would certainly seem 
adequate I should imagine. Should appreciate 
having some word from either of you. Mean-
while the estate must be dwindling at least as 
far as sustenance goes.'' 
( Tr 20, Objectors Exhibit 2) 
Dora. did not earlier press for a closing of the estate 
because she relied on Mr. Hoi ther to handle things pro-
perly, and had eonfidence that Mrs. Bundy would do 
12 
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the right thing. She also felt some delicacy in pressing 
for her legal rig·hts because of the family relationship. 
(Tr 20-23) 
Begining as early as April 19, 1948, there had been 
some negotiation among· the heirs with a view to carry-
ing out the 'vishes of the decedent as expre'Ssed by him 
in a will invalid because of improper execution. (Ex-
hibit 1) On December 5, 1948, Dora wrote Mr. Holther 
reviewing· this negotiation, pointing OUt thnt thP nelay 
was not Dora's and advising· that she and Jack would set-
tle the matter either by following her father's wishes, 
''or by settling the estate immediately under the Law of 
Succession.'' She added, ''I ~ave been wondering_ about 
the statute of limitations on widow's allowance, and on 
the debts owed the estate. What is the law in Utah re-
garding these two points." (Tr 21-24) 
The family allowance nevertheless continued. 
Then, on April 30, 1949, Mr. Holther mailed to the 
three heirs a proposal for distribution with proposed 
adjustments. (Adm. Exhibit B, Tr 36-37) The letter 
was introduced in evidence by respondent. It proposed 
that real estate previously distributed to Mrs. Bundy 
referred to in the proposal at ''Property No. 1 '' be 
charged against her share at a value of $450. In view 
of the fact that this land adjoined the tract standing in 
her name, and wa'S part of the "home lot" which she 
subsequently sold, with the improvements, for $17,900, 
this seemed only fair to appellants. They were satis-
fied with this part of the proposal and indeed did not 
apprehend that the charge would not be made as pro-
posed, even though the court appraisal was for only 
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$100, and the inheritance tax appraisal was $250. 
Because of this proposal no issue was tendered by them 
on the valuation thereof for purposes of distribution. 
It is to be observed that this last proposal still in-
cluded some beneficiaries other than the heirs at law. 
On May 13, 1949, Mr. Holther sent to the heirs a 
copy of the Final Aecount and Petition for Final Dis-
tribution. (Tr 35-36, Adm. Exhibit A) In the covering 
lettering the adjustment of inventory values for pur-
poses of distribution was discussed, and it was stated 
that in the absence of an agreement among the heirs 
the court would give each heir one-third of each kind of 
property, deducting the advances to Jack ''and deduct-
ing the value of the ten foot strip of land to Mrs. Bundy.'' 
(Adm. Exh. A p·. 2) (Italics supplied) 
Upon receipts of this communication, Dora God-
dard, who had never received a copy of the first account 
(Tr 38, 42), wired for and received from Mr. Holther a 
copy thereof. (Tr 42-43, Obj. Exh. 6, Adm. Exh. C) 
After studing the accountings, Dora retained coun-
sel, and on May 30, 1949, she wrote Mr. Holther the let .. 
ter, Objectors Exhibit 5. (Tr 37) In that letter, among 
other things, she said: 
''In reviewing the papers, we noted that Lovina 
has applied for the family allowance right up to 
the last day and we were surprised that some sort 
of an adjustment hadn't been made in view of 
the fact that there has certainly been unneces-
sary delay in settling the estate. Also, the par~ 
tial distribution gave her financial relief which 
in itself would have some ~earing on the con-
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tinuance of the family allowance. We all know 
that the estate could have been easily closed much 
sooner, and the fact that it has been held up for 
three years does not appe~ar to justify a full al-
lowance for the entire period. As our know-
ledge of estate legal proceedings is of course 
limited, I ·w .. rote you on December 4, 1948, and 
asked what limitations there were on the family 
allowance, and debts owed the estate. I received 
no reply to this letter. '' 
In that letter she also noted the proposal to charge 
Lovina $450 for the property distributed to her and 
sold as a part of her home, and she outlined briefly her 
efforts to obtain, and respondent's resistence to an early 
distribution. It is app-arent that Mr. Holther had for 
some time been trying to bring his client into agree-
ment with the other heirs as to some extra-legal distri-
bution, but that she changed her mind each time that 
agreement seemed imminent, and so delayed distribution. 
(Tr. 48-50) 
Upon being retained, counsel for appellants sought 
for ~d obtained an order continuing the hearing on 
respondent's account and petition to June 27, 1949, and 
authorizing the filing of formal objections in the mean-
time. (R 168-169) 
On ·June 27, 1949, the matter was continued to July 
5th, and on July 5th, was continued to July 26, 1949, for 
hearing. 
On July 8, 1949, appellants filed their OBJEC-
TIONS TO ACCOUNTS OF ADMINISTRATRIX, 
AND CROSS PETITION. (R 173-180) Omitting the 
formal parts, that pleading reads as follows: · 
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''Come now John A. Bundy and Dora B. God-
da.rd, son and daughter respectively of the above 
named dec.edent, and contest and object to the 
allowance· of the second and final ac.count and re-
port and petition for final distribution of Lovina 
R. Bundy, as administratrix of the estate of Ora 
Bundy, desea.sed, filed herein on the 16th day of 
May, 1949·, and for causes of contest and objec-
tions and for cross-petition against her allege 
as follows: 
~- The contestants and objectors are the only 
children of the decedent Ora Bundy and with the 
surviving widow, Lovina R. Bundy, are the sole 
heirs-at-law of said decedent. The said Lovina R. 
Bundy is and at all times herein mentioned was 
the stepmother of the contestants and the surviv-
ing widow of the decedent. As such surviving 
widow her personal interests are, and at. all times 
during the administration of the estate of said 
decedent they have been in conflict _with her du-
ties as administratrix of the estate of said de-
cedent as will hereinafter more particularly ap-
p.ear. 
2. The final account filed by said administratrix 
is incorrect in the following particulars, to-wit: 
A. By said a.ceounting, to which referenc.e is here-
by made, the said administratrix claims credit for 
family allowance in the sum of $10,600.00 paid to 
herself as surviving widow of the decedent during 
the term covered by said accounting and said ex-
penditure for the reasons hereinafter alleged 
is not proper, is not authorized in law and is ex-
cessive and unreasonable. 
B. By said accountfug and petition the said admi-
nistratrix seeks to be allowed commissions as 
compensation for services as administratrix of 
the estate of said decedent in the sum of One 
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Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and 56/100 
Dollars ($1,736.56), the granting of which con-
testants object to for the reason that said admin-
istratrix is not entitled to the same or any part 
therof and for the further reason that the same 
is excessive because said administratrix has not 
faithfully discharged her trust in the manner re-
quired by la"'" and has not earned said commis-
sions and by her violations of duty imposed by 
law· and by improper expenditures she has fore- · 
feited all right to said compensation and com-
commission all as is hereinafter more particularly 
alleged. 
3. The said administratrix after proceedings 
duly and regularly had in the above entitle matter 
was on the 8th day of July, 1946, duly appointed 
administratrix of the estate of Ora Bundy, the 
above named decedent, and she theTeupon quali-
fied as such administratrix and letters of admin-
istration issued to her and thence hitherto she has 
been and now is the duly qualified and acting 
administratrix of said es,ta te. 
4. The said Lovina R. Bundy as the surviving 
wife of the decedent and as the administratrix 
of his estate, filed herein, on the 29th day of 
April, 1947, her petition for family allowance to 
herself as such widow in the sum of Three Hund-
red and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00 per month alleg-
ing that such allowance was reasonable to be paid 
her for the period commencing with the date of 
the death of decedent on June 12, 1946, and con-
tinuing during the pendency of the administra-
tion of said estate. The said petition for family 
allowance does not state facts sufficient to entitle 
the said Lovina R. Bundy to the family allowance 
prayed for therein or any sum whatever. 
17 . 
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5. The said administratrix in the discharge of 
her trust was then and there under the duty to 
oppose the granting of any unnecessary or un-
reasonable family allowance except homestead 
rights and pursuant thereto was then and there 
under the further duty of reporting to this court 
any and all separate property or income owned 
or possessed by her. 
6. At the time of the death of said decedent and 
at all times thence hitherto the said Lovina R. 
Bundy had and she now has separate property 
and income of great and substantial value. The 
said property and income at the time of his death 
consisted of a residential property used by her 
as a home of the probable vlue in excess of Eight 
Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($8,-
500.00), United States Series E Bonds and United 
States Series G. Bonds in the joint names of said 
Lovina R. Bundy and of decedent of the value of 
$5,915.50, an interest in the co-partnership of 
Ora Bundy and Company of the fair value of 
Eleven Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($11,000.00) 
and of miscellaneous death claims upon policies 
of life insurance upon the life of said decedent 
designating her as sole beneficiary, the total 
amount of which is unknown to the contestants 
but which they are imformed and believe and 
therefore allege to be a very large sum. In addi-
tion thereto as contestants are informed and be-
lieve and therefore state the fact to be the said 
Lovina R. Bundy was at the time of the death of 
said decedent, the owner and in possession of 
other real and personal property of a great and 
substantial value, the exact amount of which is 
not known to these contestants. 
7. Notwithstanding the said duties and in viola-
tion thereof a.nd in violation of the duties of her 
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said trust n s administratrix the said lJovina R. 
Bundy failed and neg-lected to report to the court 
at the time of th~ filing· of said petition or at the 
hearing thereon or at any time thereafter the ex-
istance or the value of any of the said property 
or income and by the said violation of her said 
duties aJld by her failure to dis.close and report 
to the c.ourt the existance and value of the said 
property and income she procured the court on 
the 12th day of 1\lay, 1947, to make and enter 
an order for family allowance allowing to said 
Lovina R. Bundy as widow of the decedent, for 
her support and maintenance the sum of Three 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00) per month 
beginning on the 12th day of June, 1946 and con-
tinuing until the further order of the court. As 
contestants are informed and believe and there-
fore state the fact to be the said order was in-
advertently made by the court without knowledge 
of any of the said. property or income of said 
widow and said order would not have been made 
had the s.aid administratrix in eompliance with 
her said duties reported to and informed the 
court of her said separate property and income. 
8. Pursuant to the said order the said Lo-
vina R. Bundy has paid to herself the entire 
amount of family allowance accruing under the 
said order so inadvertently made amounting in 
all to the ·sum of $10,600.00, all as shown by the 
first account, and the said second and final ac-
count of said administratri~ on file herein to 
which reference is hereby made, and the said 
Lovina R. Bundy personally has thereby profited 
by her breach of duty and her breach of trust 
and it would be unjust and improper to allow her 
to retain the family allowance so paid to her out 
of the property of the estate of said decedent. 
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9. Thereafter and on the 27th day of August, 
1947, the said Lovina R. Bundy as the widow and 
heir of the decedent acquired as her further sep-
arate property the sum of Ten Thousand and 
00/100 Dollars ( $10,000.00) in money by a partial 
distribution of the property of this estate pursu-
ant to the order for partial distribution made and 
entered herein on said day. By reason of the 
receipt of the said money as aforesaid it there-
upon became unnecessary and unreasonable, if it 
had ever been neces-sary or reasonable, for the 
said Lovina R. Bundy to receive or to be paid 
any further family allowance out of the estate of 
said decedent. It thereupon became and it 'vas 
and ever since then it has been the duty of the 
said Lovina R. Bundy as administratrix of said 
estate in the performance of her trust and for 
the purpose of preserving the assets of said es-
tate for those beneficially interested therein to 
report to _and call to the attention of the court 
the fact of her acquisition and receipt of said 
money upon the partial distribution and the fact 
that it was no longer necessary or reasonable, 
if it had ever been necessary or reasonable, for 
a family allowance to he· paid to her as widow of 
said decedent in the sum of Three Hundred and 
00/100 Dollars ($.300.00) per month Dr in any 
other sum. It thereupon became and was and 
ever since has been the further duty of said ad-
ministratrix as it had been her duty from the 
firs~t to discontinue paying to herself as widow 
of said decedent the sum of Three Hundred and 
00!100 .Dollars ($300.00) per month or in any 
other sum as family .allowance. 
10. Notwithstanding the duties aforesaid of 
said administratrix and in violation thereof and 
in violation of her trust as such administratrix 
said Lovina R. Bundy failed and neglected to 
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report or to eall to the attention of the court the 
fact of her receipt of the said Ten Thousand and 
00/100 Dollars ( $10,000.00) or the fact tha:t it wa~s 
no longer reasonable or necessary that she pay 
to herself as widow of the decedent any family 
allowance, and failed and neglected to dis.con-
tinue paying to herself family allowances as 
aforesaid, but on the contrary she continued in 
violation of her said duties and her said trust to 
pay to herself family allowance in the sum of 
Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00) per 
month until the filing of the final account herein. 
By reason of the facts aforesaid the said Lovina 
R. Bundy has unjustly enriched herself at the ex-
pense of the trust estate in the su~ of $10,600.00 
and it would be unjust and improper for this 
court to permit said Lovina R. Bundy to retain 
said moneys or to claim credit upon her s.aid ac-
counting for the payment the-reof or of any part 
thereof. 
11. As contestants are informed and believe 
and therefore state the fact to be, this court, if the 
said facts had been reported to it or called to its 
attention, would have cancelled and terminated 
the order for family allowance theretofore pro-
cured by Lovina R. Bundy as aforesaid and would 
have ordered that no further payments of family 
allowance be made. 
12. By reason of the failure of the said Lo-
vina R. Bundy as administratrix to report or call 
to the attention of the court the facts aforesaid 
she imposed upon the court and these objectors 
all of whom are and have been entitled to repose 
trust and confidence in her as such administratrix 
and as the stepmother of these objectors, and she 
thereby wrongfully procured the continuance in 
effect of the order for family allowance and 
benefited thereby at the expense of her trust. 
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13. The time for presentation of creditors' 
claims to said administratrix expired on the 11th 
day of November, 1946. By March 1, 1947, there 
were ample funds in the hands of the adminis-
tratrix for the payment of all debts due by the 
estate. By the exercise of reasonable diligence 
or of any diligence at all the said administratrix 
would have been able to complete the adminis-
tration of said estate, file her final accounts, pro-
cure an order of final distribution and distribute 
the estate not later than September 12, 1947 
fifteen (15) months after the date of the death 
of the decedent, and it was the duty of the said 
administratrix to bring such administration to 
a close and settle her accounts and distribute said 
estate among the heirs of the decedent not later 
than said date. It was for the benefit and ad-
vantage of said Lovina R. Bundy personally to 
prolong the administration of the said estate and 
to continue to receive family allowance during· 
the prolonged administration thereof. 
14. Notwithstanding the duties of said ad-
ministratrix and in violation thereof said ad-
ministratrix failed and neglected to· exercise 
reasonable diligence or any diligence in and about 
the administration of said estate or to bring the 
administration thereof to a close and procure 
distribution, but on the contrary in violation of 
her said trust and of her said duties and to her 
own personal profit and benefit the· said ad-
ministratrix purposely delayed and prolonged the 
administration of said estate beyond the said 12th 
day of September, 1947, and beyond any reason-
able time for the completion of such adminis-
tration for the purpose, as the objectors are in-
formed and believe and therefore state the fact 
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to be of profiting at the expense of her said trust 
by the continuation of the payment to her of fam-
ily allowance as aforesaid. 
15. As objectors are informed and believe 
and therefore state the fact to be the said admin-
istratrix Lovina R. Bundy has not performed the 
"\York and services incident to her office and the 
administration of the estate of said decedent but 
said work and services have been performed by 
counsel for the administratrix for which compen-
sation has been claimed and will he paid out of 
the assets of s.aid estate and by accountants em-
ployed by said administratrix and paid out of 
the assets of said estate. 
WHEREFORE, objeetors and -contestants 
pray that said account of the administratrix Lo-
vina R. Bundy be rejected and that said admin-
istratrix be required to render a true account of 
her administration within a reasonable time fixed 
by the court and that the court adjudge and de,.. 
clare that said administratrix is not entitled to 
any credit for family allowance paid to herself 
as widow of the decedent out of decedent's estate 
and that said administratrix is not entitled to 
receive any -commission or compensation for ser-
vices as administratrix in the administration of 
said estate or otherwise and that the court charge 
s.aid administratrix with all sums heretofore paid 
by her to herself as family allowance as the widow 
of said decedent and order and require the said 
administratrix to refund to the estate of the de-
cedent all sums s.o paid with interest thereon at 
six per cent (6%) per annum from the dates of 
the payments thereof and the contestants and 
objectors have judgment against the administra-
trix for their costs of court herein. 
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Objectors and contestants pray for such 
other and further relief as may be just and equi-
table in the premises. 
/s/ Thatcher & Young 
AttoJ1neys for Contesltants 
and Objectors 
Through inadvertance, a copy thereof was not delivered 
to Mr. Holther until July 21, 1949. 
On July 28, 1949, respondent filed her MOTION 
AND NOTICE OF MOTION TO STRIKE the Objec-
tions, and her general DEMURRER thereto. (R 184-
185) 
Omitting the formal parts, the Motion is as fol-
lows: 
''TO JOHN A. BUNDY AND DORA B. GOD-
DARD, Contestants and Objectors, and to THAT-
CHER & YOUNG, E!sqs., their attorneys: 
y;ou and each of you will please take notice 
and you are hereby notified that on Tuesday the 
26th day of July, 1949, at the hour of 2:00 
o'clock P. M. of said day or as soon thereafter as 
counsel can be heard, in the above entitled Court, 
in the Court Room of Department No. 1, thereof, 
in the Municipal Building in Ogden City, Weber 
County, Utah, Lovina R. Bundy, the Adminis-
tratrix herein, will and she does hereby move 
the above entitled Court to strike from the files 
and records of the .above entitled matter that 
c.ertain instrument denominated ''Objections to 
Accounts of Administratrix and Cross-Petition" 
filed herein the 8th day of July, 1949, upon the 
grounds and for the reason that: 
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1. The same "'"as not served upon counsel for 
the Administratrix of the above entitled estate 
"'"ithin the time allo,Yed by law and the time al-
lowed by the Court therefor. 
Said motion "'"ill be made and based on this 
notice of motion and upon the pleading·s, papers, 
records and files in this action. 
Dated this 23rd day of July, 1949. 
/s/ David K. Holther 
ATTORNEY FOR ADMINISTRA-
TRIX 
Service acknowledged and copy hereof re-
ceived this 26th day of July, 1949. 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
By /s/ Roy D. Thatcher 
Attorneys for Contestants 
and Objectors 
The demurrer and motion having been argued and 
submited, the court made a minute order overruling the 
demurrer, but striking certain p-ortions only of appell-
ants' objections and cross petition. (See the Supple-
mentary Record tendered herewith for filing.) No for- · 
mal order thereon was ever made or filed, but the mi-
nute order the court struck from the objections all of 
paragraph 2B thereof, and all of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 
8 thereof. (Ibid.) 
On October 3, 1949, respondent filed her ANSWER 
TO OBJECTIONS TO ACCOUNTS OF ADMINIS-
TRATRIX AND CROSS PETITION. (R 189-191) 
Omitting formal parts, it is as follows: 
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''Comes now Lovina. R. Bundy, Adinistratrix 
herein, and answering the Objections to Accounts 
of Administratrix and Cross Petition, filed here-
in, as required by the Court, -says : 
I 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 1 
thereof, admits the contestants and objector~ 
are the only children of the decedent Ora Bundy 
and with the surviving widow, Lovina R. Bundy' 
are the sole heirs-at-law of said decedent. That 
said Lovina R. Bundy is and at all times herein 
mentioned wa,s the step-mother of the contest-
ants and the surviving widow of the decedent. 
Denies all other allegations in said para-
graph contained. 
II 
Answering the allegations of parapraph 2A., 
thereof, admits that by the final account filed 
by said Administratrix, she claims credit for fam-
ily allowance in the sum of $10,600.00 paid to 
herself as surviving widow of the decedent dur-
ing the term covered by said accounting and 
from the death of her husband. 
Denies all other allegations in said para-
graph contained. 
III 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 3, 
thereof, admits the allegations therein contained. 
IV 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 7, 
thereof, admits the Court, on the 12th of May, 
1947, made and entered an order for family al-
lowance allowing to said Lovina R. Bundy, as 
widow of the decedent, for her support and main-
tenance, the sum of Three Hundred and 00/100 
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Dollars ($300.00) per month beginning on the 
12th day of June, 19±6, and continuing· until the 
further order of the Court. 
Denies all other allegations in said para-
graph contained. 
v 
Ans,vering the allegations of paragraph 9, 
thereof, admits and alleges that on the 27th day 
of August, 1947, the Court ordered partial dis-
tribution of the property of this estate and there-
by, and pursuant thereto, $10,000.00 in money 
was distributed to each of the heirs of this estate. 
Denies all other allegations in said para-
graph contained. 
VI 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 10, 
thereof, denies all allegations in ·said paragraph 
contained. -
VII 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 11, 
thereof, denies all allegations in said paragraph 
contained. 
VIII 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 12, 
thereof, denies all allegations in said paragraph 
contained. 
IX 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 13, 
thereof, admits the time for presentation of cre-
ditors claims to said administratrix expired on 
the 11th day of November, 1946. By March 1 
1947, there were ample funds in the hands of the 
administratrix for the payment of all debts by 
the estate. 
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Denies all other allegations In said para~ 
gra.ph contained. 
X 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 14 
thereto, denies all allegations therein contained: 
XI 
Answering the allegations of paragraph 15 
thereof, denies all allegations therein contained: 
WHEREFORE, answering party prays 
that said Objections to Accounts of Administra-
trix and Cross Petition he dismissed; and for 
such other and further relief as is meet in the 
prem1ses. 
/s/ Lovina R. Bundy 
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ES-
TATE OF ORA BUNDY, DE~ 
CEASED 
/s/ David K. Holther 
AT·TORNEY FOR ADMINISTRATRIX 
Thereafter, by stipulation, appellants filed an 
amendment to their Objections and Cross Petition, add~ 
ing threto an additional paragraph 16, reading as fol-
lows: 
'' 16. The said administratrix has not inven-
toried or accounted for all of the property of 
the estate of said decedent and in particular she 
not inventoried or accounted for certain house-
hold furniture, furnishings, equipment and sup~ 
plies, the property of the decedent Ora Bundy, 
which the objectors are informed and believe 
is of great and substantial value, the exact mar-
ket value thereof not being within the knowledge 
of the objectors.'' 
By stipulation this was deemed denied by the admin· 
istratrix. (R 195-196) 
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The trial "\Yns had on the issues so drawn. 
However, in the meantime the Honorable John A. 
Hendricks, the judg·e before "\Yhom the matter was pend-
ing, happened to oYerhear some gossip intimating that 
that appellant John .;._\. Bundy, an heir and a. eo-partner 
in Ora Bundy and Co., W'"as not properly accounting to 
the partnership for its property and funds in his hands. 
(S Tr. 21-23} On the Court's own motion a citation wa.s 
. issued requiring him to appear and answer concerning 
the property of the estate ''and property and interests 
of said estate in Ora Bundy and Co." (R 187 -188) 
He appeared on August 8, 1949, in answer to the 
citation, and was . extensively cross examined by the 
Court and by counsel for the administratrix. (See the 
''Supplemental Transcript'') It there appeared that 
''Jack'' had been working actively in the partnership 
during his father's lifetime, and for a short time fol-
.lowing his death continued to be active as a partner in 
dealing with the property. It appeared that business 
records were loosely kept, and formal bookkeeping was 
not the practice in the operations in which he parti-
cipated. (S Tr 16) However, it was not made to ap-
pear that he had received any money or property for 
which he had not accounted. On the contrary, it affirm-
atively appeared that on August 10, 1946, there was an 
account stated in writing between Jack and Mr. Holther 
and it was found that there· was a balance of $862.50 
due the partnership, which Jack settled by authorizing 
this sum to he charged against his 20% share of the 
partnership assets, which was done. (S Tr. 13-18 Admx. 
Exh. "A; filed August 8, 1949, following R ~87) Mr. Hol-
ther, as appears from his correspondence in evidence, 
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was counsel for the partnership as well as for the estate, 
and the statement of account of August 10, 1946, is 
partly in his, and partly in J ask's handwriting. Jack 
testified postively that he had not received any part-
nership moneys which had not been "turned in." (S. 
Tr 18) There is no evidence to contradiate it. 
When these circumstances appeared and the Court 
was unable to give counsel the names of the possible 
witnesses whose gossip he had heard, the Court stated, 
in effect, that he would leave further action ''up to the 
estate.'' ( S. Tr 23) No action was taken by the estate. 
The issues on appellant's objections and the answer 
thereto were tried in February, 1950. At the trial the 
facts were made to appear, as appellants view it, sub-
stantially as hereinbefore outlined. On several occa-
sions during the trial the Court made comments to the 
effect that Jack had, in the Court's opinion, received 
his full share· of the estate by reason of his dealings 
with the partnership. On one such occasion counsel 
for respondent made a statement to the Court with 
respect to that situation which the Reporter unfortu-
nately did not record, apparently regarding it as argu-
ment. 
Respondent's eounsel recalls making the statement, 
and has been invited to reconstruct it for the record, 
but has declined, as he feels the matter was too remote 
in time for him to reconstruct it accurately without tak-
ing some time for reflection. He has, however, suggested 
tha.t the writer he free to state here his recollection, 
and that counsel would, if his recollection varied, then 
attempt to restate it in respondent's brief. With some 
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hesitation the 'vritPr follo,vs that suggestion, feeling tha.t 
the statement IS Yery material in view of the Court's 
findings. 
The "rriter 's recollection is that respondent's coun-
sel stated, in substance and effect, that the problem of 
Jack' dealings in partnership property and money had 
from an early time been a matter of much concern to him 
and to Mrs. Bundy, and that they had diligently pur-
sued the matter through every approach which appeared 
available; that they had had numerous c.onferences with 
Jack on the subject, and had obtained from him the ad-
missions contained in the statement of aecount intro-
duced in evidence in the hearing on the citation in Aug-
ust of 1949 ; that they were not satified that Jack had 
made a full accounting, and, like the Court, believed tha.t 
he was further indebted to the partnership, but that, in 
view of the lack of records and their inability to find 
any other evidence, or any witnesses, they were unable 
to present legal proof of their suspicions ; that the entire 
matter had been explored at the hearing on the citation, 
without avail, and that nothing more had been found 
since then, so that the administratrix was not in a pos-
tion to pursue the matter. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the matter was taken 
under advisement, and on April 24, 1950, the Court made 
and filed his "Memorandum Decree" (R 205-210) decid-
ing every issue in favor of Respondent, and, further, 
depriving Jack of the balance of his share of the estate, 
and directing distribution of the entire residue to Mrs. 
Bundy and Dora in equal shares, after allowing for ad-
vancements. Counsel for Re.spondent promptly pre-
pared formal findings and decree and_ submitted them 
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to the Court, without however Berving them on adverse 
Counsel prior to submission. On April 29, 1950, the 
Court Bigned and filed the Findings and the Decree. 
(R. 211-225). 
The Court found (Findings, paragraph 3, R. 212): 
''That on the 29th day of May, 1947 she 
filed herein inventories and appraisements ~bow­
ing all of the estate of said deceased which had 
c.ome to her knowledge and possession; said in-
ventories and appraisements totalled $81,726.52. 
That the furniture, furnishings and equipment 
of the home of the Administratrix and in pos-
session of Lovina R. Bundy, at the time of the 
death of said decedent, were purchased, in part, 
by Lovina R. Bundy, with her separate funds ac-
quired by inheritance from her father's estate 
and accumulated prior to her marriage, and were 
all joint property, and such did not, and does 
not, constitute any part of the property of this 
estate, and was properly, therefore, not inven-
toried as property of this estate.'' 
The Court, in paragraph 4 of its findings, (R. 212-
213) upon the issue of family allowance, found: 
' 'That on the 12th day of May, 194 7, this 
Court made and entered it's Order for Family 
Allowance, pursuant to verified petition therefor 
and after notice and hearing. That the petition 
therefor wa.s sufficient to satisfy the require-
menth of the statute and the sum of $300.00 per 
month, allowed by said Order, was reasonable 
and eom.mensurate with the status of the widow, 
her mode of life in the community, and with the 
size of the estate and the allowance, and the 
amount, were the exereise of the sound discretion 
of the Court. That both of the objectors had due, 
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leg·al and sufficient notice of the hearing on said 
petition, kne",. ",.hat action the Court took there-
on, and of the amount the Court granted; and 
each objector received copies of the first account· 
and report and petition for partial distribution 
and Dora B. Goddard and her husband, Grant 
Goddard, an accountant, duly examined such 
account and kne"\v exactly what ·sum had been al-
lowed to the ·widow; that the objectors were in 
a position to know, and did know, that the fam-
ily allowance was to be continued to the settle-
ment of the estate. · 
That Lovina R. Bundy and Ora Bundy, the 
deceased, were married in 1926, and at that time 
the objectors, Dora B. Goddard and Jack Bundy, 
children of the deceased by a prior marriage, 
were ten and eight years of age, respectively, and 
were thereafter, raised in the home of Lovina R. 
Bundy and her now deceased husband, Ora 
Bundy; that the major portion of decedent's es-
tate was accumulated during the married life of 
the deceased and his now widow, and at his death 
the major portion of his estate consisted of his 
interest in the Ora Bundy & Co. ; that in the 
course of the administration of this estate·, the 
widow did not as~sert her homestead exemption, 
nor did she ask for separate compensation for 
winding up the affairs of the Ora Bundy & Co., 
partnership, to which she would have been en:.. 
titled to on a separate action for winding up the 
affairs of the partnership and her thus handling 
of such affairs reduced the- amount of the attor-
ney's fees and the handling of the affairs of the 
estate and of the partnership, together, was ad-
vantageous to the heirs; that the allowance of, 
and approval of, the p,ayment of family allow-
ance to the widow up to the time of the filing of 
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the second and final ac.count by the Adminis-
tratrix, is within the exercise of the sound dis-
cretion of the Court and the Court finds it rea-
sonable to allow and approve such payment as 
provided in said accounts and reports.'' 
The Court found that the value of the 10 foot strip 
of land previously distributed to Mrs. Bundy was ''as 
appraised, to-wit, $100.00" (R. 214, paragraph 8), and 
concluded she should be charged therewith at that value. 
(R. 219). 
By paragraph 15 of the findings (R. 216) the Court 
found: 
''That the ordinary commission allowed to 
the Administratrix by }aw amounts to the sum of 
$1, 736.56, and none of such commission has been 
paid. That the Administratrix has rendered 
services herein, has fulfilled her duty as such, 
has made neither improper nor excessive ex-
penditures of the estate's money, and has timely 
performed all services herein with due dillig-ence. 
That said sum is rea~sonable.'' 
By paragraph 19 of the findings (R 216-217) the 
Court found: 
''That in the lifetime of decedent, decedent 
formed Ora Bundy & Co., a partnership, giving 
to his widow, son and daughter, shares therein. 
Such company conducted a gravel pit operation 
at Brigham City, Utah. Deceased also had pur-
chased a large stock of war surplus goods and 
was disposing of them at the· time of his death 
under an oral agreement with one, Robert Hol-
me~s. T·ha.t just prior to the death of deceased, 
the gravel pit was. sold, and much of the equip-
ment; some of the real estate was still retained. 
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There 'vas a large number of outstanding ac-
counts. The affairs of the comp~any and the- es-
tate were so intermingled that it appeared to be 
to the best interest of all that the affair-s of both 
be settled in one operation, so far as this could 
be done. Upon the appointment of the Admin-
istratrix, she immediately took over and at-
tempted to collect accounts, dispose of the re-
maining· equipment and property and the war 
surplus merchandise that was on hand. She 
found that there was no written record as to the 
agreement between decedent and Robert Holmes, 
that the accounts had been poorly kept, and after 
the death of decedent, through the connivance of 
Robert Holmes and objector John A. Bundy, 
what records there were, were destroyed or other-
wis.e hidden. The objector, John A. Bundy, not 
only refused to cooperate with the Administra.-
trir in settling the affairs of the estate and the 
company, but rather connived in most every way 
possible in hindering the settlement of the af-
fairs of the estate and company. According to 
his own testimony, he converted funds, equipment, 
and money received from the accounts, to his 
own use. The exact amount of his conversions 
has never been, and perhaps never will, he found 
out. Said objector further neglected and refused 
to make accountings to the estate and company 
of his defalcations. 
Because of his defalcations. and general con-
duct, the Court finds the objector, John A. Bundy, 
to be without standing in Court and not in a pos-
ition to challenge the acts of the Administratrix. 
The Court further finds. that the objector, 
John A. Bundy, has received all the property 
from the estate that is due him, and perhaps 
more than he is actually entitled to, by reason 
of his obstructing policies and his conversions. 
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The objector, Dora B. Goddard, and her bus-
hand, a certified public accountant, live in U ni-
versity City, Missouri; they have been of little 
or no assistance to the Administratrix in the 
conduct of the affairs and closing of the estate.'' 
The decree (R. 220-225) was entered in accordance 
with the findings and eonelusions and cut Jack Bundy 
off from any participation in the balance of the assets 
in his father's estate, approved the accounting as ren-
dered and distributed the balanee of money and other· 
asset·s to Mrs. Bundy and Dor~a Goddard in equal shares, 
charging Mrs. Bundy only $100.00 for the 10 foot strip 
of real property in question. 
On April 26, 1950, w~ile counsel for Respondent 
was preparing the proposed findings and decree he 
advised counsel for Appellants that it was his intention 
to charge Mrs. Bundy only $100.00 for the land in ques-
tion. Counsel for Appellants then informed him that 
he desired to pre.sent to the court at suitable times rep-
resentation that said land should he eharged at a value 
of $450.00 in accordance with a. proposal for distribution 
(Administrator's Eochibit B) introdueed in evidence at 
the trial and if necessary, to have the case reopened in 
order to establish the true value of the property at the 
time of the distribution. (R 235 and 244-245). Because 
there is an unfortunate divergence in the recollection of 
·c.ounsel for Respondent and the writer we do not press 
some other matters ineluded in the papers filed in the 
court below. However, counsel for Appellants relied 
upon the rule requiring the Clerk of the Court to mail 
a copy of the finding.s and conclusions and judgment 
entered immediately upon their entry and took no action 
at that time in the matter, expeeting to make suitable 
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representations to the Court in presence of counsel a.t 
such time as the Court proposed to settle its findings or 
moYe to amend the finding-s and judgment in ac.cordanc.e 
with the Rules of t'iiYil Procedure 'vithin ten days afte-r 
the entry. During all of the time counsel for Appellants 
,Yas under g-reat business pressure and engaged in ar-
ranging the affairs of his office to leave the City and 
State for the trial of a lawsuit of great importance then 
pending in the Federal Court of the· District of Idaho. 
On the 6th of 1Iay, 19·50, he wa.s compelled to leave Ogden 
for Pocatello for preparation and trial of the lawsuit 
and was compelled to remain at Pocatello until Thurs-
day, May 11, 1950, when he learned for the first time 
in a conversation with Mr. Holther that the findings, 
conclusions and decree had been signed and that no cop-
ies had been mailed by the Clerk as required by the rules. 
On that same evening counsel for Appellants was com-
pelled again to leave Ogden for the trial of the lawsuit 
in Pocatello and was compelled to be continuously absent 
until the evening of May 20, 1950, whereupon he pro-
ceeded diligently to prepare a motion for an order re-
lieving Appellants of their default upon the ground 
above summarized and for leave to file motions for 
amendment of the findings and dec.ree and Motion for 
New Trial. This motion with supporting affidavit and 
the proposed motions for amendment and for new trial 
were filed and tendered to the Court on May 22, 1950. 
(R 227-237). 
Respondent, through her counsel, filed an answer to 
the motion for relief with supporting affidavit. (R 238-
246). The matter was heard on May 29, 1950, and the 
Court entered its minute order denying the motion for 
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relief and for leave to file motion for amendment. There-
upon and on the same day and within one month from 
the date of the entry of the original decree the principle 
appeal herein was perf eeted by the filing of the Notice 
of Appeal with the cost bond as required by the Rules 
of Procedure. The formal order for motion for relief 
was not made and entered until June 13, 1950. (R 272). 
On the 15th of June, 1950, Appellants duly filed a sup-
plemental notice. of appeal to bring up before the Court 
for review the order of the Court denying the Appel-
lants' motion for an order relieving default and for 
leave to file their motions for amendment of findings 
and decree and for new trial. (R 275). 
Notwithstanding the initiation of this appeal, no 
stay bond having been filed, the Respondent proceeded 
to make distribution in accordance with the decree of 
the Court from which the appeal was taken. Dora God-
dard declined to .accept the one-half ·Share of the residue 
, because the decree having been appealed from was not 
final and she felt some adjustment was necessary. The 
Respondent then paid Dora's half to the Clerk of the 
Court to be held subject to the Court's order and paid 
to herself her one-half as the surviving widow under 
the decree of distribution. Respondent then, over Ap· 
pellants' obje-ctions, procured her final discharge as 
as administratrix. (R 250-275). 
In conclusion of the statement of facts it is perhaps 
intere:Sting to know that the Appellunts' step-mother, 
who was never gainfully employed after her marriage 
and who before decedent''8 death had spent the $3,000.00 
received by inheritance from her father, found herself 
at the conclusion of her administration of the estate for 
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the benefit of her stepchildren, "rith separate and sur-
vivorship property 'vorth approximately $±0,000.00, with 
"~idow's allo,vance paid over a period of three years in 
the sum of $10,600.00, a partial distribution some fifteen 
months after her husband's death in the sum of $10,000.-
00, an administratrix fee in excess of $1,700.00 (R 221), 
a final cash distribution in excess of $4,000.00 (R 222), 
and United States Bonds of a maturity value in excess 
of $2,800.00, together with land in Beaver County ap-
praised in excess of $300.00, a. total of $69,400.00. In 
addition to this ~Irs. Bundy had some miscellaneous 
stocks, an interest of 43lh% in the remaining assets of 
Ora Bundy & Co., together with all of the furniture 
which was in the home occupied by decedent and herself 
at the time of his death and substantially all of the 
furniture. which ·was in the home occupied by Jack at 
the time of his Father's death, as hereinbefore outlined. 
On the other hand the- stepdaughter, Dora, s~ffered 
serious illness and needed money for medical expense·s 
·and had received a $10,000.00 partial distribution, 
slightly less than $4,500.00 on final distribution (R 222), 
United States Savings Bonds of a maturity value of 
$2,800.00, 37lh% interest in Ora Bundy & Co., some 
miscellaneous stocks equal to those distributed to Mrs. 
Bundy and a large group of stocks and notes of no 
V1alue. (R 223-224). She was also at death beneficiary 
upon five $100.00 Unite-d States E Bonds worth approxi-
mately $400.00 It was not until the trial that her right 
to her own mother's piano was finally coneeded to her. 
She had, of course, also received 20% of the distribution 
from Ora Bundy & Co., which, as we compute it, had 
amounted to approximately $7,150.00 at the date of the· 
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trial. She thus realized out of her father's assets 
the approximate value of $24.,850.00 Finally Jack (who 
worked with and for his father and who is undoubtedly 
unfortunate in many respects, received from the- part-
nership 20% computed at approximately $7,150.00, a 
partial distribution of $10,000.00, a truck of the agreed 
value of $1,100.00 (R 126) and $1,500.00 as an additional 
partial distribution (R 168-169) and, by right of sur-
vivorship, two $100.00 maturity value E Bonds worth 
approximately $160.00, a total of .approxima.tely $19,-
910.00. From the work sheet proposed by Mr. Holther 
on April 30, 1949 {Adm. Exhibit B) after making an 
adjustment for the $1,500.00 partial distribution of June 
1, 1949, it appears that the decree of the court deprives 
him of some $2,000.00 in cash plus an interest in the 
remaining assets of Ora Bundy & Co., upon the sole 
justification of gossip of unknown persons overheard by 
the Judge and the suspicions of his stepmother. 
In concluding this statement of facts we wish to 
say that it has been recognized that with regard to 
Jack's effort to set ~aside this decree of disinheritance 
his interests conflict with those of his sister Dora God-
dard. A full disclosure of this circumstance- ha.s been 
made to Mrs. Goddard -and she has advised counsel for 
Appellants that she desires them to represent Jack in 
his efforts to recover the baLance of his patrimony and 
that she· does not desire to deprive him of it. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. All furniture paid for by the Decedent and not 
proven to have been the subject of executed intervivos 
gifts to Respondent, is the property of the estate, and the 
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Court erred in finding it was joint property, and in 
failing to requirt> Respondent to inventory and account 
for the same. 
2. The evidenee does not support the Court's find-
ing that John A. Bundy has received all of the property 
from the estate that is due him, and he is entitled to 
have distributed to him the balance of his one-third 
share as proposed in the petition for distribution. 
3. Upon the accounting- of the administratrix she 
should be refused credit for the sum . of. $10,600 paid 
herself as family -allowance during 3 years of adminis-
tration, she having adequate facilities at all times for 
her support. 
A. The failure of the Administratrix to make a 
full and fair disclosure of her separate property 
and resources to the heirs and the Court in con-
nection with the application for family allowance, 
and her profiting thereby at Appellants' expense, 
is extrinsic fraud requiring that the Order for 
Family Allowance be set aside. 
B. The Petition for Family Allowance was in-
sufficient to invoke the power of the court to 
grant a family allowance and the order is void. 
C. The order of the Court striking from Appel-
lants' Objections their allegations concerning the 
derelictions and fraud of the Administratrix is 
in error and should be reversed and disregarded. 
D. Under Section 102-8-1 U. C. A., 1943, a sound 
discretion, and a balancing of the equities of the 
parties, requires that Respondent be allowed no 
family allowanee. 
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4. Respondent Administratrix, unnecessarily and 
improperly, and to her own personal profit and the dis-
advantage of the heirs, delayed closing the estate be-
yond August 27, 1947, and having received on that date 
a distribution of $10,000.00 cash, in any event should 
not be allowed credit for any family allowance there-
a:rter accruing. 
5. Respondent Administratrix should not be al-
lowed compensation, and should be compelled to refund 
the same, 
A. Because she, being disqualified, waived com-
pensation when the heirs consented that she act, 
and 
B. Because by her improper adminstration, es-
pecially in regard to her failure to account for 
estate property, and her improper payments of 
family allowance, and her resistence to the proper 
efforts of the heirs to obtain an adjustment, she 
has forfeited her right to compensation. 
6. The 10 foot strip of real property distributed 
to Respondent should he charged to her at the value of 
$450.00 proposed by her counsel. 
7. The Court erred in denying Appellants' motion 
for leave to file out of time their motion to amend the 
findings and decree and their motion for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One: Furniture, the p·roperty of the estate, 
has not been, but should be in.ventoried and accounted 
for by Respond.ent Administratria;. 
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It 'vas conceded at the trial that furniture from the 
Brigham City home occupied by Decedent's son Jack 
was either property of the estate or Jack's by virtue of 
a gift from his father. Ho"·eyer, Respondent sold some 
of it for $15.00, accounting- to the estate for the proceeds, 
and the balance she appropriated to her own use and had 
in her home at the time of the trial, by her own state-
ment. On sympathetic and helpful leading by the Court, 
she said she intended to have it distributed to her and 
charged against her share. ( Tr. 77-80). This, however, 
was not done. It has never been inventoried or ap-
praised, and in the findings and decree prepared by her 
counsel no mention is made thereof. She still has it. 
The Ogden home was occupied by Decedent and his 
wife, the Respondent, as a family dwelling, from the 
time it was built in 1939 until ·his death in 1946. Most 
of the furniture therein was purchased new to furnish 
the new home, although Dora Goddard's uncontradicled 
testimony was that there were some valuable items which 
her father had owned prior to his marriage to her step-
mother. Respondent testified that she purchased a few 
_items (only two or three were identified) out of her 
separate patrimony of $3000.00. Dora conceded that a 
chair and some dishes were gifts to Respondent. But 
the great bulk of the furnishings were obviously pur-
chased and paid for by the Decedent in the course of the 
maintenance of his home as . head of the family. Re-
spondent was never gainfully employed. 
On these facts in evidence (the Court having in-
structed Mrs. Bundy not to answer Counsel's questions 
designed to identify which furniture was Decedent's and 
which the Respondent's) the Court below found that the 
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furnishing.s and furniture "were purchased, in part, by 
Lovina R. Bundy with her sep.arate funds ... and were 
all jo·irnt property, and as such did not, and does not, 
constitute any part of the property of this estate'' and 
were therefore properly omitted from the inventory. 
The Court refused Appellants' offer of the at-
tempted will (Exh. 1.) in which Decedent assumed the 
right, an incident of ownership, to dispose of the fur-
nishings in his home. It is submitted that this was 
error and that it should have been admitted as a dec-
laration of ownership bearing on his intent as to taking 
title when he purchased and paid for the property, under 
the doctrine announced in 
Stanley v. Stanley 
97 Utah 520, . 
94 P2d 465, and 
Mowrer v. Mowrer 
64 Utah 260, 
228 P. 911. 
These cases involved title transactions respecting 
real property, but it is submitted the principle is equally 
applicable to persona1ity. In the Stanley case, one of the 
facts held properly considered by the court wa.s that 
d·ecedent there disposed of the property in question by 
will. 
There do not appear to be many cases involving 
questions of title to personality as between husband and 
wife under facts like these. However, the Pennsylvania 
case of 
Kauffman v. Stenger 
30 A tl. 2d 239 
seems to be in point. 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In that case certain personal property situate upon 
the land occupied· by a husband and wife as their home 
was levied upon under a writ of execution directed 
against the property of the husband alone. The hus-
band and ,,~fe both appeared and claimed that the 
property was 0"\\1H?d by them as tenants by the entirety 
and hence not subject to levy under the execution. ,It 
was held that the evidence 'vas insufficient to show that 
the wife had any interest in the property. The court 
said: 
''In g·eneral where husband and wife live 
together in the same house and on the same land, 
the ownership of personal property, though in t_he 
possession of both, is presumed to be in the hus-
band and not in the wife. Rhodes v. Gordon 38 
Pa. 277. . .. A wife claiming property acquired 
during coverture against her husband's creditors 
is required to substantiate her claim by proof 
sufficient to repel all adverse presumptions. How 
the property was acquired, if by gift or descent, 
or otherwise, or whose money paid for i1t, de-
termines the issue. Heiges v. Pifer, 224 Pa. 628, 
73 A. 950; Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. 410. Under 
the circumstances the s·ame rule applies to the 
present case and nothing short of 'clear, full and 
satisfactory' proof can establish title by entire-
ties . . . There is no evidence as to how the stock 
which produced the increase, the subjeet of the 
(execution) sale in this case was acquired and 
in the absence of sufficient evidence the court 
was bound to conclude that the burden of proof 
of title by the entireties was not met.'' 
See also 
U·pchurch v. Upchurch 
(Georgia) 
45 SE 2nd 855. 
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If clear, full and satisfactory proof is required of 
wife to establish her title or a joint title with her hus-
band as against the creditors of her husband, it would 
certainly seem that where, as here, a widow and step-
mother claims property against the estate of her de-
cea.sed husband which she represents as administratrix 
for the benefit of her stepchildren, who have reposed 
trust and confidence in her, the proof by which she must 
establish her adverse personal claim against herself as 
administratrix should be even more clear, full and satis-
factory. As held in the case of Rice v. Rice ______________ Utah 
____________ , 212 Pac. 2d 685, an administratrix is a trustee 
in the broadest sense and is held to the same high and 
strict accountability of a trustee. For the Court to 
permit, as the trial court did, this administratrix-trustee 
to appropriate to herself property paid for by her in-
testate Without any evidence whatsoever to justify her 
personal claim of ownership, seems to the writer to out-
rage all of the concepts of equity. Certainly the only 
evidence as to the ownership of the furniture in question 
is the evidence to the effect that it was the Decedent's 
money which paid for it. We submit that the finding 
of the Court is erroneous and should he reversed and 
that the decree settling Respondent's final account 
·should he vacated and set aside and the cause remanded 
with instructions to require the Respondent personally 
and as administratrix to inventory and aecount for all 
of the Decedent's furniture which has been appropriated 
by her personally. 
Point Two: The ev·i1dence does not support the 
Trial Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received 
all his share of the property of the estate, and he is en-
titled to a further distribution. 
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Upon the death of his father, John A. Bundy by 
operation of la-\Y immediately acquired a one-third vested 
interest in the estate, subject only to administration 
under the Probate Code. The reports and accounts of 
the Administratrix affirmatiYely show that he has not 
had distributed to him the full amount of his property. 
The only possible basis for the trial court's finding 
and decree that he has had his share is contained in his 
testimony under citation on August 8, 1949. But it 
there appears affirmat~i-·cely and without contradiction 
that within two months of his father's de.a.th Jack aC'-
counted for the partnership money and property that 
had come into his hands, an account was stated and he 
paid the balance due the pa.rtnership by authorizing a 
charge to his account upon the liquidation. And there 
is absolutely no evidence that he ever took, or had, or 
received any other partnership or estate property. The 
only thing left as a basis for this act of disinheritance 
is the passion and prejudice of the trial court, appar-
ently evoked by the malicious gossip of unknown per-
sons which was overheard by the trial court alone. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that this 
was done on the trial court's own motion. Now here in 
Respondent's Petition for final Distribution does she 
allege any facts as a. basis for the court's finding num-
ber 19·, or intimate in any way that she thought Jack 
had had his share, or that he should be disinherited 
because of his ''defalcations.'' On the contrary she 
alleged (R. 158-159) that the residue should be dis-
tributed one-third to each of the three heirs, including 
Jack. 
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And at the trial, it will he remembered, counsel for 
Respondent in effect stated that he had no evidence 
to pre-sent to prove that J a.ck was further indebted to 
the partnership or the estate. 
Under these circumstances it is clear not only 
that this action of the Court is not only against the 
weight of the evidence-it is absolutely unsupported by 
any competent evidence. 
It is submitted ther_efore that the finding and de-
cree of the trial court should be reversed on this issue, 
and this court should direct a finding, conclusion and 
decree distributing to John A. Bundy one-third of the 
residue of the estate subject only to those advancements 
to him which are shown by the Administratrix's accounts 
on file herein, and compelling Respondent to disgorge 
that portion of his share which she has distributed and 
paid to herself in accordance with the erroneous decree. 
Point 3. The .Administratrix should be refused 
credit upon her accounting for the sum of $10,600.00 paid 
herself as family allowance during three years of ad· 
ministration, she having adequate faciZities at all times 
for her support. 
At the outset of a consideration of this proposition 
we are met by the contention that the Appellants are 
foreclosed by the order for family allowance made on 
Respondent's petition on May 12, 1947 and not there-
after modified or set aside during the administration 
and not formally attacked until the filing of Appellants' 
objections herein. To this the Appellants have two 
answers : First, the failure of the Respondent under the 
circumstances to make a full and fair disclosure of her 
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separate property and resources in connection with the 
application is extrinsic fraud requiring· that the order 
for family allo,vance be set aside, and second, under 
the Utah Statute (Section 102-8-1 U.C.A. 1943) relating 
to family allowance, the petition for family allowance 
did not state facts sufficient to constitute grounds for 
the issuance of the order and hence the jurisdiction of 
the court "'"as not properly invoked for the making of 
the order for family allowance and the order is subject 
to attack here. 
The allegations of the Appellants' objections and 
petition of course constitute a direct attack upon the 
order. 
In connection with the first point it is to be ob-
served that the Respondent here is in a most delicate 
position and one in which she represents conflicting in-
terests. In the first place she was the stepmother of 
the other two heirs. It is apparent from the record that 
at least so far as Dora Goddard is concerned she at once 
reposed in her stepmother trust and confidence and 
felt the natural hesitation of a stepchild to question 
the motives and the action of her step~other. Dora 
lived in Missouri throughout the administration of the 
estate. Her suggestions for the retention of counsel for 
the estate had been rejected at a meeting held immedi-
ately following Decedent's funeral. This would natur-
ally enhance her diffidence. Jack Bundy lived out of 
town all the time and it would appear from the record 
that he was not one with any great capacity for business 
detail or the legal nieeties of probate and trustee pro-
ceedings. The Respondent here upon her appointment 
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as administratrix undertook a trust in 'vhich she rep-
resented several conflicting interests. First and most 
obvious she was a surviving partner in Decedent's part-
ner·ship, and under the circumstances it was apparent 
that she would be the liquidating partner and as 
such she would have to account to herself as adminis-
tratrix and as administratrix would have to give herself 
quittance as liquidating partner. This situation is so 
obviously fraught with difficulty and possibilities for 
loss to the beneficiaries of the trust that the law (Sec-
tion 102-4-2 ( 5) U. C. A. 1943) disqualified her to act 
as administratrix. Nevertheless, she sought for and 
procured the issuance of letters to herself, and it does 
not appear that she made any disclosure to the court 
that she was disqualified to act. 
When she took her oath as administratrix she as-
sumed the duty of properly preserving the assets of the 
estate for the benefit of the heirs, including Appellants, 
to the end that the largest possible final distribution 
might be made to them. As a surviving widow of the 
Decedent applying for family allowance, her own per-
sonal interests would impel her to obtain the largest 
possible family allowance for her own use (her step-
c.hildren did not participate therein) and so to arrange 
things that the family allowance would continue for the 
longest possible time. The more family allowance and 
the longer it continued the bigger the proportion of the 
assets of the Decedent's estate would be paid to her. In 
other words, for every $3.00 family allowance she as 
administratrix could pay to herself as widow, each of 
the stepchildren would receive $1.00 less out of the 
assets of the estate. From the point of view of the heirs 
the payment of family allowance was a depletion of the 
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estate. Hence, her interests as widow in this regard 
were diametrically opposed to the interests of the other 
two heirs and to her interests as the administratrix 
whose duty it "~as to preserYe the estate for the heirs. 
Thus 'vhen she assumed the office of administratrix she 
did so under conditions such that her personal interests 
were diametrically opposed to her official duties and 
obligations. Nevertheless, she did not hesitate. 
It is apparent everywhere from. the record that 
whenever her official duties and her personal interests 
collided her official duties came off second best. Indeed 
it appears from the record that she had no scruples 
about paying herself the famil~ allowance even without 
consulting the Court about it, for on December 30, 1946, 
more than four months before the Court authorized it, 
she paid herself $1500.00 as family allowance. (R. 081). 
It is also interesting to note that she apparently did not 
feel the need for asking the Court for a family allow-
ance until some ten months after Decedent's death and 
about six weeks before she received from the partner-
ship a $7,200.00 liquidating dividend less a $2,000.00 ad-
vance thereon which had been made sometime there-
tofore. ·(See Objectors' Exhibit 7 as to partnership divi-
dend.) All this time she \vas living in the family home, 
paid for by the Decedent. 
It will be recalled that she had acquired during her 
marriage with the Decedent, and independently of De-
cedent's estate some $40,000.00 worth of assets, includ-
ing some cash and a very substantial amount of United 
States Bonds which are of course substantially the 
equivalent of cash. 
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Against this factual background let us consider 
somewhat the Utah Statute on family allowance and its 
legislative and judicial history. The present statute, 
Section 102-8-1 U. C. A. 194·3 reads as follows: 
''When a. person dies leaving a surviving 
wife, husband or minor children, they shall be 
entitled to remain in possession of the homestead 
and to the use of the property exempt from exe-
cution until otherwise directed by the court; and 
during a~ministralion shall receive such allow· 
ance out of the estate as the court may deem 
necessary and reasonable for their support. Such 
allowance may date from the death of the de-
cedent, but in case of insolvent estate shall not 
continue for longer than one year, and must be 
paid in preference to all other charges, except 
expenses of last sickness and funeral expenses 
of the decedent ·and costs and charges of adminis-
tration. The court may, in its discretion exc·lude 
from such fa.mily allow·ance, except homestead 
rights, any person who may have a separate prop· 
erty or income." (Italics supplied). 
T·he last italicized sentence of the statute was added 
by legislative amendment in 1915 under circumstances 
which will hereafter appear. 
The Statute (without the final sentence) first came 
before the Supreme Court of Utah for interpretation in 
1902 in the case of 
In re Parks Estate 
(Hilton v. Stewart) 
27 Utah 489, 76 Pac. 650. 
It was there held that-where a husband and wife had for 
many years before his death lived apart under an agree-
ment and she was not dependent on him for support, she 
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\vas not entitled to a family a.llo,Yanc.e on his death, as 
the statute g-ranting the allo,Yanc.e ""as intended to make 
immediate provision for a family \Yhen the head is re-
moved by death. 
The Statute, still \Yithout the final sentence, next 
came before the Supreme Court in 1904 in the case of 
In re Pug-sley's E1sta te 
76 Pac. 560. 
27 Utah 489 
The Supreme Court then held, without reference to its 
earlier decision, that even thoug-h a portion of the real 
estate of a decedent is set aside to the widow as her 
share of the estate she has an absolute rig-ht to the al-
lowance, the amount being· in the court's discretion. Al-
though the duration of the allowanc.e was not involved 
in the case the court observed that the period for which 
an allowance must be g-ranted is ''during administra-
tion'' of the estate. The court also considered the 
amount ($80.00 per month out of a $50,000.00 estate) 
of the allowance involved there and held it not excessive 
under the circumstances and quote-d with approval a 
text writer to the effect that: 
''In determining the amount necessary for 
such purpose reg;ard may be had to the state of 
the health, age and habits of the widow, the num-
ber and age of the children immediately depend-
ent upon her, as well as the value of the estate, 
and of her dower and distributive share therein. 
It may also he considered whether or not she is 
accustomed to hard labor, and thus enabled to 
support herself, or if, by reason of all health or 
other circumstances she is unable to do so.'' 
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Against that leg-al background the Legislature of 
Ut~ah in 1915 felt it desirable to add to the Statute there 
considered the sentence which now concludes the sec-
tion, to-wit: 
"The court may, in its discretion, exclude 
from such family allowance, except homestead 
rights, any person who may have a separate pro-
perty or income.'' 
It is obvious that between 1904 and 1915 the work-
ings of the rule announced in the Pugsley ease had been 
found to he unjust and inequitable to heirs other than 
the widow, as in the ease now at the Bar of the court, 
and that the Legislature added this sentence to over-
come the hard and fast rule of the Pugsley case. It is 
clear that the Pugsley case is no longer the law ex-
cept as to the factors to he ineluded in determining the 
amount of the allowance. 
It is also abundantly clear that under the law now 
existing, including the Statute and the surviving por-
tion of the Pugsley ease, the amount of the separate pro-
perty and of the separate income of a person applying 
for family allowance is essential and material to a de-
termination of the amount of the family allowance to 
be ordered by the court. Without this information it is 
impossible for the court to exercise a sound discretion, 
or for the administrator to know whether or not his duty 
would compel him to oppose the granting of a, family 
allowance. 
To illustrate this point let us suppose two cases iii 
both of which the children of the decedent have reached 
their majority. In the first case suppose the widow 
applying has a separate estate invested in United States 
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interest paying bonds bringing· her monthly income of 
$1,000.00 "\vhile the estate amounts to no more than $10,-
000.00 and the ehildren of decedent are both ill and un-
able to "\York. In the second ease suppose a widow who 
is ill and "\vithout any separate property or income and 
the estate amounts to $1,000,000.00 in cash and inte-rest 
bearing bonds "\vhile the children of the decedent have 
reached their majority and are all well and self-support-
ing. It is apparent that no court could exercise a pro-
per discretion in fixing the amount of the allowance 
without every one of these facts before him in each case. 
It is further apparent that the misrepresentation 
of any one of these facts, such as the separate property 
and income of the applicant, or the failure to report such 
a fact "~hen under a duty of full and fair disclosure, is 
an extrinsic fraud rendering a decree obtained thereby 
void at the election of any interested p·arly. 
That is the law in Utah applicable to the personal 
representative in a deeedent 's estate. See 
Rice v. Rice , 
------------ utah ------------
212 Pac. 2nd 685, 
where this court very recently held that an executor is 
a trustee owing an obligation to his legatees and de-
visees and to the .court and that an executrix who in dis-
tributing property improperly omitted land on which 
building and facilities used by a brother were located 
and omitted water rights as well was guilty of extrinsic 
fraud justifying intervention of a court of equity. This 
court there remedied the situation upon a petition filed, 
as here, in the probate proceedings. In that case this 
court quotes with approval from the case of 
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as follows : 
Larrabee v. Tracy (Cal. App.) 
126 Pac. 2nd 947, 951 
' ' Initially we desire to make it plain that an 
executor or administrator occupies a postion of 
the highest trust and confidence, not only to the 
creditors and beneficiaries of an estate but to the 
Court as well, and so he is required to act in 
entire good faith. * * * Accordingly an executor is 
a trustee in the broadest sense and is held to the 
same high and strict accountability of a trustee. 
* • • 
"It is clear from the letters that appellant 
was guilty of extrinsic fraud and that the trial 
court was justified in so finding. But quite 
apart from the extrinsic fraud, the trial court 
was justified in vacating the order and decree 
on, the ground that the executor had not made 
to the court a full and fair disclosure of the rights 
of respondent. * * * (Italics supplied.) 
''Here the executor in his capacity of resid-
uary legatee was unjustly enriched by the cons-
truction placed by the court upon the will upon 
his ex parte showing, to the improverishment of 
the legatee entitled to her legacy. It was a fraud 
of the most serious nature. It involved not only 
a breach of fiduciary duty to the respondent' but 
a breach of duty to the court." 
It is submitted that these cases are exactly in point. 
Here the widow and the administratrix are one and the 
interests of the two positions are conflicting. Here the 
administratrix was under a duty to protect the assets 
of the estate and that duty involved a duty to make a 
full and fair disclosure to the court of all of her sep-
arately owned property and income in connection of her 
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application for a family allowance. She made no such 
full and fair disclosure and at the time she applied for 
an order for famiy allo\Yance neither reported her sep-
arate property nor filed the inventory showing the 
value of the estate. "\'Vithout presenting any testimony 
or evidence and upon allegations \vhich were- mere con-
clusions she obtained an order of the court pursuant to 
which she has profited at the expense of the estate to 
the extent of $10,600.00. 
Non-disclosure is a failure to reveal facts. It may 
exist where there is neither representation nor conceal-
ment. A person who stands in a fiduciary or confiden-
tial relationship to another party has a duty to reveal 
all relevant facts. 
citing 
Restatement of the Law, 
Restitution, Section 8, 
Comment B, Page 33, 
Restatement of Agency 
Section 390, and 
Restatement of Trusts 
Section 170 (2). 
And where a relationship of trust and confidence exists 
between the parties there is a duty to disclose all ma-
terial facts, and failure to do so constitutes fraud. 37 
CJS 247. 
Morever when a person in a fiduciary relation to 
another acquires property, and acquisition or retention 
of the property is in violation of his duty as a fiduciary, 
be holds it upon a constructive trust for the other. 
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R·estatement of Restitution 
Section 190, Page 780. 
We submit it is also the law that where in the absence 
of consent by a beneficiary a constructive trust would 
arise, the consent of the beneficiary or his failure to 
protest does not preclude him from enforcing a con-
structive trust if the beneficiary did not know his rights 
and the material facts which the fiduciary knew or 
should have known, or if the transa.ct·ion was not fair 
and reasonable. 
Restatement of Restitution 
Section 191. 
And a. transaction between the fiduciary and the bene-
ficiary in which the· fiduciary is dealing on his own 
aecount in regard to a matter within the scop~ of the 
relation, can be set aside if the transaction is not fair 
and reasonable. 
Restatement of Restitution 
Section 191, Comment on 
Clause (d), Paragraph e. 
And in 2 Bancroft Probate Practice, Page 648, it is said: 
''The relations of both executors and admin-
istrators to the estate and to those theyrepresent 
are confidential and fiduciary, and they act in 
a high fiduciary character in their dealing with 
the estate and its funds. They are required to 
exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with 
heirs or devisees or others whom they purport 
to represent .... 
''It is fraud in law for the representative 
to take, for his own benefit, a position in which 
his interest will conflict with his duties.'' 
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Because of the Respondent's fiduciary relationship 
she o"'"ed a duty of full and frank disclosure to the 
Court and to .~..:\.ppellants. Her failure to do so is con-
structive fraud. It exists irrespective of moral guilt. 
Her breach of leg·al and equitable duty is declared fraud-
ulent by the law· '~ heeause of its tendency to deceive 
others, to violate public or private confidenee, or to in-
jure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of pur-
pose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of con-
structive fraud.'' 
37 'C.J.S. 211-212. 
It is submitted that because of the fraud inherent 
in her taking- a position 'vhere her duties and interests 
conflict, in her failure to disclose, and in her profiting 
thereby, the order for family allowance is void and she 
can take no comfort therein. It follows that she has 
paid herself $10,600.00 of the estate's money withou1 
any authority and should not be allowed credit therefor. 
There is an additional reason why the Respondent 
cannot hide her profit at the estate's · expense behind 
the order granting- family allowance. The Statute pro-
vides for ''such allowance . . . as the Court may deem 
necessary ... '' 
It is to be observed that there is in Respondent's 
petition for an allowance no allegation whatsoever of 
any facts showing the allowance to be necessary. There 
is not even an allegation of the legal conclusion that the 
requested a1lowanc.e was necessary. Nor is there any 
allegation coneerning~ the value of the estate, nor any 
allegation or report of the petitioner's separate pro-
perty and income 'vhich would have stirred the court's 
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discretion in opposition to the Petition. The inventory 
had not been filed. No evidence was introdueed at the 
hearing; the court merely found the allegations of the 
verified petition were true. 
We. submit, that the petition and the record sup-
porting it are insufficient to invoke the exercise of the 
trial c.ourt 's jurisdiction to grant a family allowance and 
the order therefor is void. 
As was held by this Court in the case 
Stoekyards National Bank 
v. Bragg 
67 Utah 60, 
245 P. 966, 
while jurisdietional facts need not he recited in an order 
to properly invest the court with jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, they must appear somewhere in the re-
cord that describes the matter for the court's adjudica 
tion and is the foundation for the order. A judgment 
which is beyond or not supported by pleadings must fall, 
and a judgment founded on a record showing that the 
fundamental law w:as disregarded in its establishment, 
is subject to direct and collateral a:ttack, a.nd will sua 
sponte he notieed by courts and acted upon by them. 
See also 
Richins v. Hadlock 
80 Utah 265, 
15 P. 2nd 285, 291, 
to the effeet that ''if judic.al direction is essential, it is 
just as essential that a proper and sufficient petition or 
· initial pleading of some kind be filed to invoke judicial 
action.'' (Italics supplied.) 
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In the criminal case of 
State Y. Durfee 
77 Utah 12 
290 P. 9·62, 
it wa.s held tha.t if facts alleg-ed do not constitute an of-
fense, the defect may be raised eyen after veridict, and 
the infirmity may be raised at any time, either before 
or after judgment, and in a direct proceeding ''may sua 
sponte be noticed and acted upon by the appellate tri-
bunal.'' 
See also 
Worley v. Peterson 
80 Utah 27 
12 P. 2nd 579, 587. 
30 Am. Jur. "Judgements," Section 148. 
Appellants' Objections and P~tition, being a direct 
application in the same proceeding and to the same 
court that considered the petition and granted the order, 
and being based upon fraud in law and the insufficiency 
of the supporting record, constitute a direct attack upon 
the order. 
Intermill v. Nash 
94 Utah 271, 
75 Pac. 2nd 157. · 
This case, morever, comes within the express ex-
ception of Section 102-1-8, U.C.A., 1943, providing that 
an erroneous or defective statement of a jurisdictional 
fact ''is available only on direct apvlication to the same 
court, or on appeal.'' 
And see also the recent case of 
61 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In re Linford's Estate, 
Linford v. Linford 
------------ Utah ------------
207 P. 2nd 1033, 
where this court held that an order settling a final ac-
count and decree of summary distribution entered after 
due notice and hearing, did not protect an administra-
trix against a petition in the same proceeding seeking to 
compel her to file a true and correct inventory and have 
the property reappraised and distributed as provided 
by law. The court said: 
''This is not an ac.tion against the administra-
trix, but rather a petition directing the Court's 
attention to .certain alleged fraudulent and im-
proper acts on the part of the administratrix, 
and requesting that the Court require her to pro-
perly administer the estate.'' 
We submit that this case is directly in point here. 
Withdrawing funds from the estate for the· personal 
advantage of the administratrix is precisely the same 
as withholding funds or property which should have 
been included. It is also direct authority for the point 
that the approval of Respondent's first a.ceount herein 
does not afford her any protection against this proceed-
ing to compel her properly to account for the funds and 
property of the estate. 
We submit that the actions of the Respondent here· 
are not hidden from the eyes of the Court by the orders 
upon which she relies, b LlL c.u ,_:; h' ·(~ i 1 >. and equitably 
open for inspecton and correction in this proceeding. 
If it be eontended that some of the facts hereinbe-
fore argued are not properly before the court because 
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the allPgations thereof "·ere by the court stricken from 
Appellants' Objections, the sufficient answer is that 
the order (if a minute order is effective) striking such 
allegations "Tas error, and should be reversed and dis-
regarded. In the first place, the authorities above cited 
establish the releYance and materiality of these facts 
and the allegations thereof. In the second place, Res-
pondent's 1Iotion to Strike \vas directed only to the en-
tire pleading, not to the parts thereof, and was made 
only upon the ground that the pleading was filed late 
w·ithout leaYe of court. The Objections, however, were 
filed before any default was claimed or proceedings 
taken, and, under the Code of Civil Procedure then in 
effect, the time to plead was not shut off, but was in 
effect thereby extended. 
Sanders v. Milford Auto Co. 
62 Utah 110, 
218 P. 126. 
The Court's order striking a part only of the Ob-
jections was obviously on its own motion, as Respon-
dent made no such motion. And where a pleading is 
entirely material, or only in p·art immatrial, it is secure 
against a motion to strike .the whole. Where there is 
relevant matter (which is apparently conceded here) 
included within a portion of the pleading to which a 
motion to strike is directed, the motion should he denied 
under the Code. 
1 Bancroft's Code Pleading 897 
1 Bancroft's Code Pleading, etc., 
10 year Supplement, 342-3. 
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It would seem that by her fraud Respondent may 
well have forfeited the right to a family allowance un-
der these circumstances. But even if it were to be con-
ceded tha!t the court, upon the making of a full and fair 
disclosure would then have the rigbt to award her a rea-
sonable family allowance to date from the death of the 
decedent, as the court below attempted to do by its find-
ing that it would have approved the allowance even had 
the disclosure made a·t the trial been made previously, 
still we submit that under all of the facts and circum-
stances in this case it was and would be an abuse of the 
trial court's discretion under the statute to allow the 
widow a family allowance to the extent of $10,600.00, 
two-thirds of which must come from the share of her 
stepchildren, or to any extent in the light of the sep-
arate property owned by her or acquired by her by vir-
tue of the decedent's death. 
Here we have a widow almost in the prime of life, 
with no showing of any disability, who has become in-
dependently wealthy through her marriage to the father 
of her stepchildren. In adition to her indepdent wealth, 
amounting to some $40,000.00, she will inherit equally 
with each of her two stepchildren. There has been no 
showing whatsoever of any actual need of a family al-
lowance during any reasonable adminstration of the 
estate. On the other hand the undisputed evidence shows 
that the appellant Dora Goddard has been ill and under 
very heavy medical expense and needs the money. When 
all of the facts and equities are considered, we submit 
that it was an abuse of discretion to allow this step-
mother so to profit at the expense of her stepchildren 
whose interests she, as a trustee, was duty hound to 
protect. 
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Point .f. RespoHdent .... 4.dminstratria;, unnecesarily 
and improperly, and to her own personal profit and the 
the disadvantage of the heirs, delayed closing the est.a.te 
beyond Au.gust "27, 1947, and, having recei.ved on that 
date a distribut,io-n of $10,000.00 cash, ·iiJ~ any event should 
not be allowed credi.t for any family allow~ance there-
after accruing. 
Whatever may haYe been the necessity of a family 
allo·w·ance for Respondent prior to August 27, 1947, it 
disappeared on that date when she received a distribu-
tion of $10,000.00. It is Appellants' position that hav-
ing received that distribution, her duty to the estate, 
and to the heirs, required that she call the matter of the 
family allowance to the court's attention with a view 
to having her family allowance then discontinued. She 
did not do so and here again Appellants' contend that 
she was guilty of constructive fraud and should not be 
permitted to retain the fruits thereof. 
It is true that the statute says "that a widow shall 
receive such allowance as the Court may deem necessary 
and reasonable ''during administration.'' Under the 
statute as amended it was within the court's discretion 
to exclude the widow entirely because of her separate 
property, even from the first, and certainly it would 
seem to be the court's duty to do so when the bulk of 
the estate was distributed after some fourteen months 
of administration. The statute· does not require a family 
allowance ''during the entire period of administration.'' 
It only requires that ''during administration'' that 
allowance which is necessary and reasonable shall he 
granted. Certainly the requirement that the allowance 
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he limited to that which is deemed necessary and rea-
sonable-, limits and modifies the phrases ''during ad-
ministration", so that if the court in exercise of its 
sound discretion should deem it necessary and reason-
able to grant an allowance for six months of the period 
of administration but unnecessary and unreasonable to 
pay a family allowance thereafter, by reason of the sep-
arate property of the recipient, the spirit and letter of 
the statute is followed with respect to the duration of 
the allowance. In several of our sister states the statute 
is very similar, providing that the court must make 
''such reasonable allowance out of the estate as shall 
be necessary for the maintenance of the family, accord-
ing to their circumstances during the progress of the 
settlement of the estate." It would ~eem that the phrase 
''during the- progress of the settlement of the estate'' 
is substantially the equivalent of the U tab phrasing 
"during administration." Under such a statute it has 
been held in California that it is proper to discontinue 
the allowance to the widow after making changes in the 
estate hy establishing a probate homestead. 
In re Taylor's Estate 
55 Pac. 2nd 537. 
Morever, since the policy of the law is speedy settle-
ment and distribution, the phrase ''during the progress 
of the stttlement of the estate'' is construed to mean 
"during the time reasonable necessary" for settling 
and closing the estate. An order for family allowance 
therefore must he presumed to be satisfied when the 
time arrives at which the estate may be settled; else 
the administrators may delay action until the whole 
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estate is consumed and nothing left to those who are 
entitled to a distributive share of its assets. As was 
observed in the niontana case of 
In re Dougherty's Estate 
86 Pac. 38: 
"\"\..,. e do not think the law, though it is ex-
ceedingly regardful of widows and children 
deprived as they are of their natural supporter, 
completes any absurd result.'' 
Clearly a wido"~ who is also the representative is not 
entitled indefinitely to prolong the settlement of the 
estate and thus to continue to receive family allowance. 
In re Ekins' Estate (Montana) 
208 Pac. 956. 
There is, moreover, no merit in the contention that one 
cannot object to credits claimed in the widow's account 
as representative for family allowance paid to herself 
after the expiration for a reasonable time for closing 
the estate because the objector might have compelled 
final settlement and distribution at the proper time. In-
dulgence of others is no excuse for failure of the repre-
sentative to close the estate at the proper time. 
In re Dougherty's Estate, supra. 
The last mentioned case seems to have become the 
leading decision on the subject. 
It is probably helpful to note that this court in its 
very recent decision in the case of 
In re Proudfit's Estate 
----·------------ Utah ----------------
219 Pac. 2nd 1076, 
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has adopted the philosophy that a personal represen-
tative having a personal interest to be served thereby 
cannot as against an interested party with an adverse 
interest, claim eredit for expenses of administration dur-
ing a prolonged administration, because conceivably if 
such expenses were sufficiently high and the adminis-
tration prolonged, the expenses would consume the en-
tire value of the estate. That was a case in which oper-
ating expenses of real property were disallowed as de-
ductions for state inheritance tax purpose, but the prin-
ciple involved is identical. 
In the case at Bar certainly no sufficient reason 
is made to appear why the first account and petition for 
partial distribution could not have been made a final 
account and petition for final distribution. The bulk 
of the assets. both in the estate and the partnership had 
been liquidated and the interest in the partnership could 
have been distributed in kind, as it was upon the final 
distribution when made. As a matter of fact, notwith-
standing the court's finding, it affirmatively appears 
from the record that the partnership was liquidated as 
a separate legal entity from the estate as contemplated 
and required by law. All claims except estate and in-
heritance taxes had been paid and it is admitted that 
there were adequate funds on hand to pay them and all 
unpaid charges of administration. No one stood to 
profit by the prolongation of the administration except 
the administratrix. No excuse has been presented why 
the inheritance and estate tax returns were not earlier 
filed and the tax paid. 
Our l!tah Statute contemplates and requires an ex-
peditious administration. Under the provisions of Sec-
tion 102-12-4 U. C. A., 1943, it is required that real estate 
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must be distributed to the heirs at la'v as soon as the 
time limited for presentation of claims has expired, 
unless it satisfactorily appears that the rents are neces-
sary to pay the debts of the decedent. And by Section 
102-12-6, U. C. A., 1943 ; it is provided that when all 
debts are paid, or sooner if before that time there a.re 
sufficient funds in the hands of the administrator for 
the payment of all debts and the estate is in a condi-
tion to be closed the administrator must render his fi-
nal account and pray for settlement and distribution. 
It is submited that in this case the Respondent has 
violated her statutory duty by prolonging the settle-
ment of the estate beyond the time when she presented 
fier first account au_d has profited at the expense of 
the heirs by breach of duty to the extent of two-thirds 
of the family allowance accruing after the date speci-
fied. She should not be permitted· to retain the· pro-
ceeds realized by her breach of trust but should be com-
pelled to disgorge them for the benefit of the heirs, the 
beneficiaries of her trust, in accordance with the auth-
orities hereinbefore cited~ 
Point 5. Resp<Ondent .Administratrix should not be 
allowed compensation, and should be compelled to re-
fund tha.t received becau.se she has W'airved compensa-
tion a.nd beca.use by improp·er and fraudulent adminis-
tration she has forfeited her right thereto. 
The question of the waiver of the administratrix's 
compensation was not one of the facts alleg·ed in Appel-
lants' Objection, the matter not having come to coun-
sel's attention until the morning of the trial. However, 
at the trial of the issues evidence of the waiver was 
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tendered and received pro forma under objection that 
it was not within the issues and then striken because no 
issue on waiver had been pleaded. 
It is submited that the amendment should have been 
allowed under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) U. R. C. P. 
providing as follows: 
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on 
the ground that it is not within the issues made 
by the pleading, the court may allow the plead-
ings to be amended when the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be suhserved there-
by and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or de-
fence upon the merits.'' 
No claim was made at the trial that the allowance of 
such evidenee would prejudice Respondent. It is, of 
c.ourse, thH established policy of the courts in Utah to 
allow amendments liberally in the interest of justice and 
with a view of obtaining a final trial of all issues on the 
merits. If the amendment had been permitted, the evi-
dence would have clearly presented a waiver. It ap-
pears that the agreement to serve without c.ompensa-
tion was a part of the consideration upon which the Ap-
pellants here agreed to waive the statutory disquali-
cation of Respondent to act as administratrix. A pro-
mise or agreement made by a proposed personal rep-
resentative that he will not charge for his services is 
equivalent to a renunciation of his claim. 
In re Machado's Estate (Cal.) 
19H Pac. 505. 
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The Respondent here, having' obtained from her step-
children a \Yaiver of her disqualification in order to se-
cure her appointment, should not now be permitted to re-
nounce her renunciation and to claim compensation con-
trary to her original promise. To do so, we submit, vio-
lates the very essence of the principles of equity and fair 
dealing. 
It is a general rule that an administrator who has 
been guilty of fraud, willful default, gross neglig·enee or 
other misconduct in administration by reason of which 
the estate has suffered detriment, may be deprived of 
all or part of the compensation to which he would other-
wise be entitled. Whether or not the misconduct is such 
as to warrant the_ refusal of compensation in any parti-
~ular case is a matter resting within_ the discretion of the 
court. Conduct of a personal representative causing un-
necessary expense to the estate, such as fomenting vexa-
tious and unneccessary litigation, may be considered a 
sufficient cause for disallowance of commissions. (Here 
the Respondent, in an effort to retain famliy allowance 
improperly paid to herself and furniture and other p-ro-
perty of the estate improperly withheld from the estate, 
has forced the estate's beneficiaries to appeal to the 
Supreme Court.) And where a personal representative 
without just cause delays the settlement of the estate or 
the distribution of the assets, compensation may be re-
fused. Moreover, where a representative fails to account 
for assets belonging to the estate he may be denied com-
pensation. See 
34 C.J.S., Page 1046 et seq. 
and the cases cited. 
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In connection with this point it is very interesting to 
observe that substantially all of the communication be~ 
tween the administratrix and the heirs was conducted 
through the attorney for the estate and apparently he 
himself worked out all of the schedules for proposed 
distribution, a function which should normally fall upon 
an administrator. Although the administratrix may 
have performed more of the duties of her office than the 
Appellants were first advised of, she ce.rtainly has not 
personally performed all of them and her counsel has 
personally c.arried very much of the load, in addition to 
the legal maters, for which he was independently paid 
out of the assets of the estate. 
The compensation allowed the Administratrix by 
the trial court amounts to some $1, 700.00, two-thirds of 
which in effect comes out of the pockets of Appellants. 
Certainly it does not seem right and just to pay this 
compensation to the Respondent for services conducted 
in such a manner that the beneficiaries of those services, 
toward whom she ·bears a fiduciary relationship, have 
been compelled to carry this very expensive litigation to 
the Supreme Court in order to secure their rights. It 
is submitted that under all of the facts and circum-
stances the administratrix ~hould be deprived of her com-
pensation because of her misconduct, or if an order of 
forefeiture is not made by this court, the order, the order 
of the trial court refusing. Appellants' tendered amend-
ment should be reverse·d and the c.ause remanded for the 
trial of the issue of waiver. 
Povnt 6. Thie 10 foot strip of re:al property· distri-
buted to Respondent .should be charged to- her at the 
valu.e of $450.00 proposed by her counsel. 
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Throug·hout the trial of the issues on their object-
ions the Appellants, relying· upon the proposal of Res-
pondent's counsel contained in Administratrix's Ex-
hibit B "~hich had been mailed them just shortly before 
filing their objections, assumed that the Administratrix 
"'"ould carry out the proposal and charge herself $450.00 
for the 10 foot strip of land distributed to Respondent 
and "'"hich formed part of the lot on which the family 
home "\Yas situate. It will be recalled that Respondent 
sold this home as her own property shortly after the 
distribution for $17,900.00. Certainly it would seem that 
a valuation of $450.00 is modest enough. While the ap-
praisers in their routine- appraisement might have felt 
the value to the estate was only $100.00 when the land 
was considered as an isolated 10 foot strip, yet when it 
became legally attached to the proper~y of the Respon-
dent Administratrix and was an integral part of a valu-
able home, its value was obviously enhanced. 
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that 
the Respondent at any time intended to repudiate the 
proposal made by her counsel, which, it must be as-
sumed, was made by her authority. It wasn't until after 
the trial of the issues of fact was completed that Appel-
lants learned for the first time that the Respondent in-
tended to repudiate her proposal and to charge herself 
only $100.00 in accordance with the routine court ap-
praisal. 
It is submitted that this is such double dealing by 
a fiduciary that the court should not permit it to stand 
but should either direct that the administratrix be 
charged at the proposed sum or remand this cause to 
the trial court for the taking of evidence as to the fair 
value to be used for purpose of distribution. 
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Point 7. The trial cou.rt erred in denying Appel· 
lants' motion for leave to file out of time and motion 
to amend fi~dings and decree arnd their motion for a 
new' trial. 
Under the circumstances set out in the affidavits 
on file it is submited that the failure of Appellants' 
counsel to file their motion for amendment of the judg-
ment with respect to the $450.00 item to be charged to 
Respondent and their motion for new trial was excus-
able neglect. That counsel for Appellants in charge of 
this matter was out of the state on urgent business al-
most all of the time while the ten day period allowed 
by Rule 52(b) is not disputed. Neither is it disputed 
that the Clerk failed to mail the copy of the findings 
and decree required by Rule 77 (d), nor that counsel had 
relied thereon. 
Under these circumstances it is submitted that the 
exercise of a sound discretion required that Appel-
lants' counsel he relieved of his default and permitted 
to file Appellants' motions for amendment and new 
trial out of time under the provisions of Rule 60 (b). The 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Hill v. Hawes 
320 u. s. 520 
decided in 1943, long before Utah adopted the Federal 
Rules of Procedure, held that counsel for parties in lit-
igation were entitled to rely upon the mailing of the 
notice and that where counsel had so relied and notice 
had not been given it was proper for the court to re-
enter a judgment and permit an appeal to be taken with-
in the appeal period after the re-entry of judgment in 
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order to relieYe the party from a judg-ment or order 
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect. When Utah adopted the 
Rules of Procedure it added to Rule 77 (d) a final sen-
tence to avoid the effect of this decision as to the time 
of appeal only, but the effect of the decision a.s to re-
lieving· a party of his default as to any other proceed-
ing \Yhich must be taken \Yithin a fixed time after judg-
ment was allo,ved to stand. Certainly that is reason-
able and proper, for a ten day limitation on filing mo-
tion to amend and motion for a new trial is much more 
stringent than the thirty day limitation on the taking 
of an appeal. We submit that under the law and on 
reason the trial court should have relieved Appellants 
of their counsel's Q.efault and permitted the filing of 
their motions out of time. 
Probably any benefit that could have been gained 
by presenting the motion for new trial can he accorded 
by this court upon the appeal, so that the question of 
the presentation of a motion for a new trial to the trial 
court has become largely moot. 
However, we submit that the trial court should be 
reversed as regards his refusal to receive and file a 
motion for amendment of the judg-ment and the cause 
should be remanded for suitable proceedings looking to 
the amendment of the judgment to charge the Respon-
dent $450.00 for the strip of land distributed to her as 
discussed under Point 6 supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
.' This has been a difficult case to try and to brief. 
While we regret the length which this brief has assumed 
the writer does not feel that he could in justice to his 
clients effectively present the many points involved 
with less space. The writer only hopes that his efforts 
will he of some assistance to the court in arriving at a 
just conclusion. 
It is respectively submitted that equity and just-
ice require that.. the rulings of the trial court upon the 
various points hereinbefore considered should be re-
versed and the cause remanded with instructions to the 
trial court to disallow the Respondent's claimed credit 
for family allowance and for compensation and to re-
quire the Respondent properly to account for all of 
the funds and property of the estate, including furni-
ture, which have come into her hands and for which 
she ha.s not accounted and that the trial court should 
be further directed to charge Respondent $450.00 for 
the 10 foot strip of land distributed to her. 
Very respectfully submitted, 
Paul Thatcher 
For 
T'HATCHER & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Appellants 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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